



Social Media Jihad

SCREENSHOT ISLAMIC STATE POPAGANDIST ARTWORK

Good morning. It's an honor to be here with you. Thank you for your service.

I'm excited to have this opportunity to talk to you about a topic which I refer to as "social media jihad."


NOTE: This material comprises remarks prepared by Michael S. Smith II for his presentation delivered during the NC-SC Counterterrorism Conference hosted in North Charleston, SC by the National Sheriff's Association, titled "Social Media Jihad" (15 February 2016).



My name is Mike Smith. I'm a terrorism analyst with Kronos Advisory. Among my specialties is analysis of influence operations of Salafi-Jihadist elements like al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State.

Now, I've been told self-deprecatory comments can serve as a good icebreaker for presentations on such important issues.

SCREENSHOT *ISIS STORM: AMERICA ON ALERT* (NBC/HISTORY CHANNEL)



This effort has begun to catch the eye of those in high places. As retired Gen. David Petraeus, a former commander in Iraq and Afghanistan and a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, commented via email: “[Smith] has shared with me some of the open source data he has provided to various U.S. agency officials, and I can see how that data would be of considerable value to those engaged in counter-terrorism initiatives.”

So, while I have had the privilege of collaborating with legends from the USIC like CIA's original AQ analyst Cindy Storer, who has joined me here today, along with high-profile groups of cyber operatives like Ghost Security Group and ControlSec, a member of which, former Miss Jordan Lara Abdallat, is on the left of this slide ... And while members of Congress like Sue Myrick, who helped organize this conference, have taken interest in my work ... And while senior figures from the USIC like former CIA Dir Petraeus have provided their imprimaturs for the data I have been helping generate regarding the Islamic State's online activities ... And while foreign governments' interests in this data has landed me in some fairly exotic places — the photo on the right was taken in Dubai last year ... And while a producer from a major television network will be filming this presentation ... I want to acknowledge up front ...



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Stay Thirsty!

... I am not this guy. But I do want you to stay thirsty. So, at the conclusion of this presentation, I will present a small cash prize to the audience member who is the first to answer a pop quiz question. So please pay careful attention to what I'm going to share with you. I've been given a small window to cover a big topic.



How does the Islamic State use social media? The simplest answer to this question is: More aggressively than any other terrorist group in history. Meanwhile, the truth is, the Islamic State is using social media in a variety of ways, and for a variety of purposes. All of which is aimed aimed at advancing a globally-oriented agenda at the expense of US/allied interests. Indeed, ultimately, the Islamic State is using social media as a crucial tool to manage the most dynamic, and, arguably, the most effective global influence operation of any terrorist group in history. To that end, for analysts, it's not uncommon that a given social media post from the Islamic State can be interpreted as being intended to serve an array of purposes. Some of which are strategic in orientation, while others are of a more tactical character.

This presentation was developed to help inform understandings of how the group is using social media to pursue several objectives part of the group's larger agenda, with focus on objectives which are of foremost concern to counterterrorism practitioners tasked with managing threats posed by the Islamic State within the US. In addition, this presentation aims to help inform understandings of certain drivers of this phenomenon.



NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

June 2011



“Since the beginning of 2011, the transformative change sweeping North Africa and the Middle East — along with the death of Usama bin Laden — has further changed the nature of the terrorist threat, particularly as the relevance of al-Qa’ida and its ideology has been further diminished.”

A couple of years ago, senior officials anticipated that those of you in this room would probably be less likely to be on the front lines in the war on terrorism. However, the death of Usama bin Ladin and the sweeping changes taking place throughout the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab Spring did not render the ideology which informs the agendas of terrorists comprising the Global Jihad movement less of a threat to the US and its allies.¹

1. See “National Strategy for Counterterrorism.” The White House (2011).

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC



A Persistent Threat


The Evolution of al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists

Seth G. Jones



*The number of Salafi jihadists more than doubled from 2010 to 2013 ...
The war in Syria was the single most important attraction for Salafi-jihadist fighters.*

Figure 3.2
Number of Salafi-Jihadists by Year, 1988–2013




RAND RR637-3.2

As was highlighted in a 2014 report by Dr. Seth Jones about participation in the Global Jihad movement during and following the Arab Spring, there is hard evidence which illustrates the base of adherents to the ideology which informs the agendas of all elements comprising the Global Jihad movement — be it al-Qa'ida or the Islamic State — has exploded in recent years. According to Dr. Jones' findings, the number of Salafi-Jihadists more than doubled between 2010-2013.²

As Dr. Jones' research further highlights, a key driver in this new growth phase for the Global Jihad movement is the Syrian Jihad.

2. Seth G. Jones. "A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists." RAND (2013).



*“Speech will not benefit
you without action, for
there is no faith without
action.”*

—Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

Why should this matter to law enforcement officials in the US?

The answer is: Because all elements comprising the Global Jihad movement are adherents of an ideology known as Salafiyya Jihadiyya. This is an intensely orthopraxic ideology.³ Faith is demonstrated by action — jihad.

For all elements comprising this movement, their jihad aims to reduce the influence capabilities of so-called “unIslamic” entities. Their primary targets are the US and its allies. Salafi-Jihadis view Western nations in particular as responsible for corrupting Islamic societies, and, more broadly, creating conditions in the world which prevent the “true” faith from enjoying the role in all facets of life which they say was intended by the Prophet Mohamed, his companions, and the Salaf. For these elements, the abolition of the caliphate in the 1920s by Turkish premier Mustafa Kemal was the result of growing Western secularist influence in the Muslim world.⁴

According to Salafi-Jihadis, Islamic scripture and traditions demand that a caliphate exist. Accordingly, a separation of church and state is anathema to the model of life provided by the Prophet Mohamed, his companions, and the Salaf. As you may know, the Salaf were the first generations of Muslims. In a short span of time, they grew the original caliphate into one of the largest empires in world history.

3. See discussion of “Islam as an orthopraxis” in the Salafi spectrum of Sunni Islam in Emmanuel Sivan. “The Clash Within Islam.” *Survival*. Vol 45, No 1 (2003). Pages 25-44.

4. See chapter titled “Why They Did It” in Mary Habeck. *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*. Yale Univ Press (2006).

تَكْفِير

For the Islamic State in particular, the target list for this jihad is massive. So-called “disbelievers,” a term used to refer to individuals who do not profess to be Sunni Muslims, are not the only targets. Further, leveraging takfirist logic more aggressively than al-Qa’ida, the Islamic State has branded all Muslims who do not pledge allegiance to their so-called “caliph,” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as legitimate targets in terrorist attacks.

Takfir is the practice of accusing a Muslim of apostatizing, or turning one’s back on the faith via failure to either demonstrate adherence to guidance for Muslims provided by religious texts and religious authorities, or living one’s life in a manner which is inconsistent with models for behavior encouraged by various Islamic traditions.

Traditionally, the caliph has held a superior rank over all Muslims, serving as a religious, political and military leader. Traditionally, Muslims pledged allegiance to the caliph. Therefore, according to the Islamic State, anyone claiming to be a Muslim who does not pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi is turning his/her back on their professed faith. And, in many Muslim societies, corporal punishment has traditionally been meted out to address such acts.

Takfir is a term which is often used pejoratively in popular media throughout much of the Muslim world, and in reference to radical elements like IS. This is because the practice of takfir is very controversial, as Islamic scripture prohibits Muslims from causing harm to other Muslims. Hence al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders took issue with the brutal terror campaigns waged by al-Baghdadi’s predecessor, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which often killed more Muslims than Western troops.⁵⁶

5. In July 2005, al-Qa’ida’s then deputy commander Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote to al-Zarqawi to encourage him to modify his strategy so as to improve the prospects that, with his help, al-Qa’ida might restore a caliphal model of governance in the Levant. English-language translation accessible at the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point’s website via <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-Translation.pdf>

6. Also in 2005, the senior al-Qa’ida leader known as Atiyatallah sent a critical letter to al-Zarqawi to encourage him to revise his tactics due to concerns his brutal campaigns may result in the blowback encountered by the GIA in Algeria during the 1990s. English-language translation accessible at the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point’s website via <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/atiyahs-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2>

with obstacles that only serve the tawaghit.

In short, these groups gave preference to popularity and rationalization over pleasing Allah and relying upon Him alone. They became embarrassed of acknowledging undeniable shar'i fundamentals, such as takfir of the clear tawaghit and murtaddin.

When the Islamic State of Iraq was announced – after going through the phases of war – it had the effect of exposing all the jihad claimants in Iraq, splitting


DABIQ 1 (JULY '14)

Indeed, while al-Qa'ida's agenda is defined by takfirist logic, its current leader has rigorously endeavored to cast aside the moniker of takfiri that has been applied to his terrorist organization by popular Arab media.⁷ Meanwhile, the Islamic State has gone so far as to portray al-Qa'ida and the Muslim Brotherhood as unIslamic due to their failures to rigorously enforce takfirist principles in their treatments of individuals who do not support their Islamist agendas. For example, see the excerpt from the first issue of *Dabiq*, a publication produced by the Islamic State's official media wing, al-Hayat, provided in this slide.

For CVE professionals, this should make it easier to generate anti-IS partners than has been the case with elements like al-Qa'ida. Because this creates an exploitable tension between Muslims who do not pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi and his terrorist organization, which is accusing those Muslims of apostasy.

7. Ayman al-Zawahiri. *Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet*. 2ed (2010). As-Sahab Media Foundation (al-Qa'ida).

#WEWILLBURNUSAGAIN



Adherents of Salafiyya Jihadiyya, the ideology which informs both al-Qa'ida's and the Islamic State's agendas, have made a conscious decision to assume responsibility for doing a variety of things to demonstrate their faith. This includes punishing the US and its allies.

As they see it, the US and other Western powers are managing a crusade aimed at erasing the "true" faith from the earth. Whereas Salafists are beholden to countering Western influence through preaching and proselytizing, Salafi-Jihadists believe that the "enemies" of the faith will not relent in their crusade in response to words alone. Therefore, violence is a necessity.⁸

And when it comes to achieving influence over elements comprising this movement, few things are a more powerful credential than having the blood of Westerners on one's hands. Indeed, a key objective part of the Islamic State's social media campaign is to build brand equity within the Global Jihad movement at the expense of al-Qa'ida's brand equity. IS's strategy clearly entails engineering a persona of a group which aims to do something bigger than the 9/11 attacks of 2001, as one French-speaking Islamic State member put it in a video published online by the terrorist group late last year.⁹

On this slide there are four screenshots: The background is an advertisement circulated in IS social media networks for a propaganda video released last year, titled "We Will Burn America Again." As you can see, this video was promoted on Twitter using the hashtag term #WeWillBurnUSAgain. In the foreground are screenshots of Twitter posts by IS members late last year that contain addresses for former DIA Dir Mike Flynn, CIA Dir John Brennan, and former NCTC Dir Matt Olsen. The purpose of these posts is to stimulate interest among the terrorist group's support base in assassinating symbols of the US national security community. (Gen Flynn confirmed that was his address; he had moved months earlier.)

8. Sayyid Qutb. *Signposts* (1964). Translations of relevant section of text contained in Gilles Kepel. *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh*. University of California Press (1985).

9. "Paris S'est Effondré." Official Media Wing of the al-Halab Province (Islamic State). November 2015.



“ISIL has used cyber to its great advantage, not only for recruitment and propaganda, but also to hack and release sensitive information about US military personnel. As a non-state actor, ISIL displays unprecedented online proficiency.”

In his testimony delivered before the Senate last week that was part of the US Intelligence Community’s annual World Wide Threat Assessment, DNI Clapper covered several of the items I’ve been asked to speak with you about. In DNI Clapper’s words: “ISIL has used cyber to its great advantage, not only for recruitment and propaganda, but also to hack and release sensitive information about US military personnel. As a non-state actor, ISIL displays unprecedented online proficiency.”¹⁰ Yet, based on the screenshots I’ve included in this and the previous slide — screenshots which document where IS’s hacking division has posted home addresses for senior intelligence officials, including DNI Clapper and CIA Dir Brennan — the Islamic State’s interest is not exclusive to US military personnel. Indeed, elected and unelected individuals who represent America’s governmental institutions have been designated targets by the Islamic State.

10. DNI James R. Clapper. Opening Remarks, IC’s Worldwide Threat Assessment. 9 February 2016. Accessible via http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2016-02-09SASC_open_threat_hearing_transcript.pdf



Now that we can all agree the data highlights we have a big problem on our hands — not just in the Middle East and North Africa, but also here in the West — let's take a look at some things that will provide context for the issue I'm here to discuss with you.

In my view, the Islamic State's prolific exploitation of social media technologies highlights a natural evolution in engagement strategies among Islamist and Salafi-Jihadist elements that have historically harnessed many of the public relations tools used by mainstream institutions. The suggestion that federal officials and executives at social media companies couldn't see this coming defies credulity. Particularly when you consider there is volumes of information in the Open Source Center concerning terrorists' social media accounts going back years. If you don't know what the Open Source Center is, please go to opensource.gov and register for an account. Therein, you'll find one of the largest repositories of English-language translations of foreign-language OSINT available in the US.

Raise your hand if you can identify all three of the individuals featured in this slide.

On the left, we have Sayyid Qutb. Qutb was a member of the Guidance Council of the Muslim Brotherhood's Egyptian Branch.¹¹ Soon after his appointment to the Brotherhood's Guidance Council, he was appointed to lead the Brotherhood's Qism Nashr al-Dawa (Propagation of the Call Department). His role as a chief propagandist for the Brotherhood was expanded with his appointment to the position of editor-in-chief of its weekly publication, titled *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*.¹² He was also one of the most popular Muslim writers of his time, with powerful elements like the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia endorsing his works like *In the Shade of the Quran*. For the Wahhabis, Brotherhood thought leaders were important sources of counter-narratives to Egyptian strongman Gamal Nasser's vision for a pan-Arab, versus a pan-Islamic, future for the Middle East and North Africa.

Due in large part to his publication of a work titled *Signposts*, alternatively *Milestones*, which effectively provided a roadmap for the Global Jihad movement, Qutb was found guilty of treason and executed by the Nasser government in 1966. The section of this work covering the topic of jihad was so alarming that, for decades, editions of the work approved for distribution throughout much of the Muslim world did not include this section due to restrictions imposed by various governments.

11. John Calvert. *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islam*. Oxford University Press (2013).

12. See discussion of Qutb's work as propagandist in Jarret M. Brachman. *Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice*. Routledge (2009).



Although Muslim Brotherhood thought leaders have advised that readers of this material should carefully consider the harsh conditions Qutb and other MB members encountered in Egypt when Nasser cracked down on the group, and although the organization has more recently been focused on advancing its Islamist agenda via the ballot box versus the bullet, the Brotherhood has not officially dissociated their “movement” from Qutb’s clarion call to jihad.

Today, Qutb is widely regarded among experts as the godfather of that which some refer to as the “modern jihad.” An exhaustive study completed by analysts at the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point in 2006 highlighted that, in the oeuvre of jihadist theoreticians’ works which inform the agendas of elements comprising the Global Jihad movement, Qutb’s works are the most influential.¹³

So it is hardly a coincidence that, titled “al-Qa’ida al-Subah” (The Solid Base),¹⁴ the article published in the April 1988 edition of *al-Jihad* magazine by Afghan Jihad leader Abdallah Azzam (the guy in the middle on the slide) that functioned as a mandate for the creation of al-Qa’ida by his mentee Usama bin Ladin (the guy on the right) reads like a condensed iteration of Qutb’s infamous jihadist manifesto, *Signposts*. In which, Qutb wrote, an Islamic revival must be launched by force by an Islamist “vanguard” who will strive to topple governments which stand in the way of Islam enjoying universal dominion within the Muslim world, “followed, sooner or later, by their conquest of world domination.”¹⁵ Al-Qa’ida fashioned itself as this “vanguard.” But today, the Islamic State claims to be leading the jihad charted by bin Ladin, whose successor, so IS has claimed in its propaganda materials, has steered al-Qa’ida off course.¹⁶

While dead, all three of those individuals before you enjoy iconic statures in the imaginations of the Islamic State’s support base.

13. William McCants (ed). “Militant Ideology Atlas.” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point (2006).

14. Abdallah Azzam. “Al-Qa’ida Al-Subah.” *al-Jihad*. April 1988. Pages 4-6. Original text and translation accessible via http://kronosadvisory.com/Kronos_InsideTheJihad_AlQaidaAlSubah.pdf

15. Translation and analysis of Signposts in Gilles Kepel. *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh*. University of California Press (1985).

16. Unattributed. “Responding to the Doubts.” *Dabiq*. Issue 7 (Feb 2015). Al-Hayat (Islamic State). Page 25. While extolling bin Ladin, whom the author refers to as the “reviver of the era and crusher of the Americans, the man equal to an ummah,” the author asserts al-Zawahiri “abandoned the pure heritage left by Shaykh Usama [bin Ladin].”



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Wife of Shaheed ~ Abu Hussain Al Britani

[federalregister.gov/articles/2015/...](https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/09/30/2015-24894/in-the-matter-of-the-designation-of-sally-anne-frances-jones-also-known-as-sally-anne-jones-also)

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2h

A very good article by sheikh Anwar Awlaki about targeting civilians in non Muslim countries that are at war with us.

justpaste.it/target_awlaki



So if you see someone on Twitter or Facebook encouraging a young person in your community to seek out copies of Qutb's writings, there's a very good chance that this young person is being engaged by a recruiter for a terrorist group. And if you see someone downloading messages from the likes of bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki and other influential deceased al-Qa'ida figures, be aware that, despite the competition for influence underway between al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State, you may have an IS sympathizer on your hands. Indeed, bin Laden's legend is being appropriated by IS propagandists. And the guidance for Muslims provided by al-Qa'ida mouthpieces like al-Awlaki is promoted by IS propagandists. For example, both al-Awlaki's and bin Laden's statements were leveraged to make the case for why Muslim's should support the Islamic State's jihad in a feature article titled "Reflections on the Final Crusade" that was published in the fourth issue of *Dabiq*.¹⁷ It is also common to find images of bin Laden and references to his statements in Islamic State propaganda videos. For example, the image on the previous slide is a screenshot of an Islamic State propaganda video that contains images of bin Laden. It is often the case that bin Laden is used by IS propagandists to stimulate thoughts about the 9/11 attacks of 2001.

On the left of this slide is a screenshot of a Twitter account that was managed by Junaid Hussain's widow, Sally Jones. As you can see, she is not only advertising where one may find Secretary of State John Kerry's designation of her in the Federal Register;¹⁸ she is promoting material by Anwar al-Awlaki. On the upper right is a screenshot from an IS video featuring a jihadi whose kunya is bin Laden. (Note: A member of the bin Laden family confirmed for me that he is not a member of Usama bin Laden's family.) Below this, we have screenshots of a video released in January 2016 by IS's Libya operatives to encourage more jihadis in Somalia to defect from al-Qa'ida's East Africa branch, al-Shabaab, and join IS. The video begins with bin Laden speaking about the importance of, in his words, "pledging obedience to the group most practicing the truth and characterized by it."

17. Unattributed. "Reflections on the Final Crusade." *Dabiq*. Issue 4 (Oct 2014). Al-Hayat (Islamic State). Pages 43-44.

18. John F. Kerry. "In the Matter of the Designation of Sally-Anne Frances Jones, Also Known as Sally Anne Jones, Also Known as Sally Jones, Also Known as Umm Hussain al-Britani, Also Known as Sakinah Hussain, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist pursuant to Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as Amended." 21 September 2015. Accessible via <https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/09/30/2015-24894/in-the-matter-of-the-designation-of-sally-anne-frances-jones-also-known-as-sally-anne-jones-also>

19. Michael S. Smith II. "Bin Laden Family Member: DA'ISH's 'Bin Laden' Not a son of Bin Laden." *DOWNRANGE*. 16 April 2015. Accessible via <http://insidethejihad.com/2015/04/daishs-bin-ladin-not-a-son-of-bin-ladin/>



AL-JIHAD

SCREENSHOT *MANHUNT: THE SEARCH FOR BIN LADEN* (HBO)

Several things I just mentioned are closer to the topic I'm here to discuss with you: Influence operations. More specifically, Islamist and jihadist elements' uses of popular media to shape perceptions.

During Qutb's time, formal publication was a format which bolstered perceptions of the credibility of a given group's narratives. Equally important, it provided ease of access. And ease of access is crucial.

The reason IS propagandists have established a model of open communications on popular, easy-to-access spaces of the Internet like Twitter is because, in relation to the capability to achieve immediate impact, a pivot to the Dark or Deep Web would be tantamount to suddenly announcing all future statements from the group will be issued solely in Sanskrit. The group utilizes spaces of the Internet which a majority of the members of its target audiences are familiar with — especially young individuals in the West. This ensures the terrorist group's content is accessible, especially via mobile devices. Of course, this also ensures supporters can immediately notify IS's global support base of acts of terrorism they have committed to demonstrate their allegiance to the terrorist group's leader.

In the cases of Qutb and Hassan al-Banna, who was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, the aura of credibility established with large production and distribution runs for books, newspapers and pamphlets was crucial. Their writings covered topics that, traditionally, only people holding a variety of religious credentials — credentials which they lacked — could speak authoritatively about. So they packaged their materials in manners which provided an authoritative veneer. Inasmuch as these materials were engineered to promote awareness of, and attract support for their Islamist agenda, these products helped create a persona for the Brotherhood of a well-organized, influential institution. Think political party.

Fast forward to the 1980s: Among the key tools Abdallah Azzam and his mentee Usama bin Ladin used to drum up support for the Afghan Jihad were books and pamphlets authored by Azzam, such as *Join the Caravan*, along with an official magazine for the Afghan Jihad, titled *al-Jihad*. Also of vital importance was coverage of their activities by the news media. Through all of this, they cast the Afghan Jihad in the light of a manifestation of divine providence — a project that all Muslims should support. And once the lesser-equipped mujahidin realized success over the Soviet Union, one of the world's two great powers during the Cold War, perceptions of the credibility of their claim that it was the "will of Allah" for jihadis to drive "unIslamic" elements out of so-called "historically Muslim lands" grew.

القاعدة الصلبة

الحمد لله وحده
عبد الله عز وجل




الحمد لله وحده والسلام على من لا نبي بعده. أما بعد ..
فكل مبدأ من المبادئ وأصلها من طبيعة تملكه. وتتمثل وهي شئ عظيمها
الى المجتمع تشكيله عالمية وتبعيات باهظة. وما من عقيدة من العقائد أرضية
كانت أو صورية إلا واحتاجت الى هذه الطبيعة التي تبدل في سبيل نعمة عقيدتها أرضية
تملكه وتتمثل في هذه الطبيعة التي تبدل في سبيل نعمة عقيدتها أرضية
الله لها التمكن والظهور. وهذه الطبيعة التي تبدل في سبيل نعمة عقيدتها أرضية
وما تملك من أجل اظهار عقيدتها فان العقيدة تتولد ميتة وتواد قبل ان ترى النور والحياة.
وتشار حامل العقيدة من أبناء هذه الطبيعة لابد ان يكون: « قل ادعوا شركاءكم ثم
كيدون فلا تنظرون ان ولي الله الذي نزل الكتاب وهو يتولى الصالحين » الاعراب 195-197

ما كنت أدرك أبعاد التركيز على طول فترة
التربية العنكية كما أدركها الآن واضحة جليسة
لا ليس فيها ولا غير بعد أن خفت غمار الجهاد
الأفغاني والعام الساج والحمد لله. ولقد سبقت
أعوان المسألة لوجود التربية العقلية الطولية
هي أساس المجتمع الإسلامي وعموده. وبدونها لا
يمكن أن يقوم المجتمع الراسي وان قام فانه
سيكون هيكلا هشا سرعان ما ينهار لجهة ربح أو
خروج مامعة.
وهي:-

- 1- لابد أن تشب في أئمة العبادات يمكن الله لهم في الأرض ويجعلهم سائرًا لقدرة
وان حمل السلاح قبل التربية الطويلة للعبة المونة
يعتبر امرًا خطيرًا لأن حملة السلاح يتحولون الى
عصابات تهدد أمن الناس وتقتل عليهم مفاصلهم .
- 2- أن تكون القيادة العربية تشاركتها مسيرة
الاستلاء والعرق والدماء. فلابد أن تكون القيادة
هي المعنى الداعي الذي تنمو تحت أجنحته هذه
الأفراع ولابد من طول مدة الحضانة وتربية
الرضع ويكون لها طابع متفرد من متاع الدنيا
الرخيصة ويتفكر في أن تتفرع عن متاع الدنيا
الزهد والتفكر.
- 3- ولابد أن تكون متعلقة باليقين الراسخ
بالعقيدة مع أهل العرش الذي يملأ جوانحه
بانتصارها.
- 4- ولابد من الأصرار والعزيمة على مواصلة السير
بها طال الأمد .
- 5- ولابد من الأصرار والعزيمة على مواصلة السير
بها طال الأمد .
- 6- ولابد من الأصرار والعزيمة على مواصلة السير
بها طال الأمد .
- 7- ولابد من الأصرار والعزيمة على مواصلة السير
بها طال الأمد .

أنه لا يمكن للمجتمع الإسلامي أن يقوم بدون
حركة إسلامية تشب على نار المحنة ويستفح
أفرادها على حرارة الابتلاء. وهذه الحركة
تشب الصاعق الذي يهجر طائعات
الأمم. ويقوم جهاد طويل طائعات
فيه الحركة الإسلامية دور القيادة
والريادة والإمامة والأرشاد
ومن خلال الجهاد الطويل تتغير
مقادير الناس وتبرز طاقاتهم
وتتحدد مقاماتهم. وتتقدم
قاداتهم لتتوجه المصيرية وتمسك
بالرسم. وهؤلاء بعد طسول

الجهاد العبد العادي والأربعون. نيسان 1408هـ - أبريل 1988م



أسلامية شهرية خاصة بالجهاد الأفغاني تصدرها دار الجهاد في بيشاور ، باك
وئيس مجلس الإدارة الدكتور عبد الله عز وجل
الإشراك السوي 20 دولارًا للزاد آسيا وأفريقيا 30 دولارًا للجنة دول العالم .
No: 802 Peshawar Pakistan عنوان المراسلات



وتكرمهم بأبواب الله
لأول " الجدار السياسي " عقبة يتش أن
أفغانستان .. ولي أماكن أخرى كتب
أن يكتلوا معهم الشعب الأفغاني ورا
في الحرية فاسما مشتركًا يجمع كل فئات الشعب
تتمتع بالقول إنهم يستطيعون على معظم أفغان
عليها (في أسوأ تقدير لانجاراتهم وا
يشي أن تحول الجهاد فيها أو يُترغ
ان اللعبة السياسية والمؤامرات الدولية
إذا حدث ، بل أن هناك هروبًا د
وحيث يتشد الكرب ، ويرداد .
ويخرج القوموس ليستولى على
المصير محسبًا لينا جميع
يوما مستبداً والإعداد
والاستدراك والإعداد
مرحلة من العمل
عبر اجابة وأحد
وقولاً له ولا
حديث " قد
وتشاعرا
في أر
وأم

U.S.A.
552 ATLANTIC AV. BROOKLYN-NY
11217 U.S.A. TEL 718-9340349
ISLAMIC CENTER TUCSON 1627/E
1 ST TUCSON AZ 85719 U.S.A.

W. GERMANY
M.S. VERINGUNG E.V. MAINZER
LODSTER 176 6000 FRANKFORT
A.M. MAIN W. GERMANY
ISLAMIC CENTER WALLNER
1-3/8 MUNCHEN 45/ W. GERMANY

U.K.
ISLAMIC INF CENTER-233 SEVEN
SISTERS ROAD
LONDON N4-2DA / U.K.
P.O. BOX (334)
CRYDON/CRG-3TF/U.K.
LONDON W2 32
HERE FORD ROAD / U.K.

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3270 GOYER N' 402 MONTERIAL
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OUT KIP-5P8/ CANADA

SPAIN
CENTRE ISLAMIC - MADRID-C-ALANSO
P.O. BOX (12315) CANO 3/ SPAIN

SWEEDEN
ISLAMICKA FARBUNDER HOGBERGS

القائمة: دار الجهاد من 1987 إلى 1988
البحر

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SWEEDEN
ISLAMICKA FARBUNDER HOGBERGS

On this slide we have the contents page of the edition of *al-Jihad* which contained Abdallah Azzam's article titled "al-Qa'ida al-Subah," or "The Solid Base." As you can see, aside from offices in the Muslim world, the magazine contained contact addresses in the USA, West Germany, the UK, France, Spain and Sweden. For what was to become the al-Qa'ida network, ease of access was an openly acknowledged priority.



FLANKED: Abu Abdulla (Osama Ben Laden) flanked by Abu Ridwan, Algeria (left) and Abu Mahmood from Syria.

oulder to shoulder with Mujahedeen

A report by Jamal Khashoggi

the Soviet Union invaded one of its neighbors, Afghanistan in order to prop up a discredited Communist regime. The hollowness of Kremlin's claim at the time that and temporary operation became clear very soon. There has been a ruthless, villages and the civilian population of which tens of thousands have died and four struggle by Afghan Mujahedeen which led to the Geneva accords of last month the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the return of refugees.

the Qur'an and Arabic," he said.

Sheikh Sayyaf added that the Arab brothers proved their bravery time and again in combat and won the admiration of the trained Mujahedeen. Indeed, the martyrdom of a particular Arab youth made a great impact on the Mujahedeen who felt as if they had lost one of their major strongholds.

Perhaps it is worth mentioning that Sheikh Sayyaf's adviser is an Egyptian and

The Arab Mujahedeen are not at all happy with the recent Afghan agreement signed by the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. They are deeply worried about the future of the freedom struggle. After visiting various military quarters Osama Benladen (Abu Abdullah) confirmed that there is no let up in their jihad against the Communist forces.

According to information he received, violent confrontation between the Mujahedeen

Azzam and bin Ladin also created a celebrity like status for the "Arab Afghan" jihadi fighter for key audiences — not only in places like Saudi Arabia or Libya, but also as far away as Europe and the United States. So one could reasonably argue that they were basically harnessing marketing concepts developed in the West. Indeed, by the 1980s, a celebrity was among the most powerful marketing tools in the world. (S)he was the embodiment of success, and a figure whose successes others strove to achieve for themselves while emulating as much of their behaviors as possible. (Think *Dallas*, and the immense success of its clothing line.)

Today, much of the Islamic State's propaganda is designed to "celebritize" fighters. The Islamic State's seemingly omnipresent status in mainstream media news cycles also serves to generate this effect for (potentially) sympathetic audiences, as major news organizations typically focus on covering important events, organizations and individuals.²⁰

20. "And of course, ISIS also manipulates us, television news. They put their videos online; we put them on television." Fareed Zakaria in Fareed Zakaria GPS. "Blindsided: How ISIS Shook the World." CNN (2015). 20:51. Accessible via <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOPPQTqZx-U>



EAST AFRICA EMBASSIES PLOT

CIA'S FIRST 2 CASUALTIES IN WAR WITH AQ



MOGADISHU



USS *COLE*

While the celebrity-like status of the jihadi fighter did a great deal to help cultivate interest in the Global Jihad movement, in relation to influence capabilities within the movement, nothing proved more valuable to al-Qa'ida than matching words with deeds. As the leadership within the Islamic State is well aware, it was when al-Qa'ida really started doing things that members of older jihadi groups al-Qa'ida was merely trying to collaborate with threw their support behind bin Ladin. Eventually, al-Qa'ida's current leader formally joined them when he merged the militant faction of Egyptian Islamic Jihad with al-Qa'ida just before the 9/11 attacks of 2001.

That so many aspirant jihadis threw their support behind bin Ladin during the 1990s, but especially after the 9/11 attacks of 2001, highlighted just how powerful a tool a pattern of action is when it comes to the matter of influencing adherents to Salafiyya Jihadiyya.



هذا وعد الله
"THIS IS THE PROMISE OF ALLAH"

TRANSLATIONS
ENGLISH
РУССКИЙ
FRANÇAIS
DEUTSCH
الفرقان

The Perfect Storm

What started as an explosive movement in Iraq has now suddenly turned into a global phenomenon that the West and the democratic world as a whole is ill-equipped to deal with. - John Cantlie

Fast forward from the 1990s to 2012: Yes, bin Ladin is dead ... but the Syrian Jihad is galvanizing Salafist and, more notably, Salafi-Jihadist spheres in a manner not seen since the Afghan Jihad, the Bosnian Jihad, or the jihad that erupted when the US "occupied" Iraq. With the fall of Mubarak ... With the ouster of Qadhafi ... With the shift of focus on the parts of conservative Gulf states like Qatar from helping Islamist elements effect regime changes in North Africa to limiting Iran's influence capabilities in the Middle East vis-à-vis the overthrow of the Assad regime ... With the rise of governments in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia that were either unable or unwilling to take action to prevent Salafi-Jihadist elements from utilizing these countries as bases to train and deploy terrorists to conduct operations elsewhere ... With the Islamist government of Turkey — a NATO member — turning a blind eye to terrorist groups' uses of its territory to move individuals and materiel into Syria ... With even the world's foremost influential Sunni clerics like Muslim Brotherhood thought leader Yusuf al-Qaradawi proclaiming that support for the Syrian Jihad is obligatory for each Muslim ... With the US calling for Assad to step down, but then refusing to take decisive action to remove him from power after he killed more of his own people than Saddam Hussein and Qadhafi ... With the US troop drawdown leaving an ill-equipped and evidently unmotivated Shiite-majority force to "deter" a potential resurgence of al-Qa'ida-affiliated elements within majority-Sunni environs of Iraq that connected to ungoverned spaces in Syria ... With all of this and more taking shape, in Syria and Iraq, the stars aligned for the Global Jihad movement in a manner never seen before. Indeed, as the Islamic State would eventually describe it in the pages of *Dabiq*, a "perfect storm" had unfolded.

Not only did Syria become a veritable vortex for aspirant jihadis from around the world; the mix of new membership growth opportunities and the very real potential of establishing a base for both regional and global operations became a recipe for something truly ambitious. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of al-Qa'ida's Iraq-based network, who had deployed operatives like Abu Mohamed al-Jawlani to Syria to establish a new branch of al-Qa'ida (Jabhat al-Nusra), recognized that all of the energy surrounding the Syrian Jihad and the ever-growing human resources base available in Syria could be harnessed to achieve the goal shared by al-Qa'ida and all other elements comprising the Global Jihad movement.²¹ And several

21. In al-Qa'ida's "Constitutional Charter," the group's goals are defined as "The victory of the mighty religion of Allah, the establishment of an Islamic Regime and the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate, God willing." See "Al-Qaida: Constitutional Charter, Rules and Regulations." DIA Translation (2002). Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point. Accessible via <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Al-Qaida-Constitutional-Charter-Translation.pdf>



هذا وعد الله
"THIS IS THE
PROMISE OF ALLAH"

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الإفراق

The Perfect Storm

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months after al-Qa'ida's senior leadership took the unprecedented step of kicking al-Baghdadi out of al-Qa'ida due to his insubordinate posture, in mid-2014, with a message titled "This is the Promise of Allah" that was published on the World Wide Web in half a dozen major languages, his group declared it had achieved that which al-Qa'ida has been striving to achieve since its inception in the fall of 1988: Restoration of a caliphal model of governance upon so-called "historically Muslim lands." Further, with this declaration, al-Baghdadi's group demanded all groups striving to achieve this goal disband, with their members pledging bayat (allegiance) to the new caliph, al-Baghdadi.²²

22. "This is the Promise of Allah." Al-Hayat (Islamic State). June 2014. (English-language translation of Abu Mohamed al-Adnani. "This is the Promise of Allah." Al-Furqan (Islamic State). June 2014.)

As-Sahab Media

Profile

مؤسسة السحاب
@_s7ab_m

310 TWEETS 56 FOLLOWING 20.6K FOLLOWERS

Follow

مؤسسة السحاب @_s7ab_m 4h
#مؤسسة_السحاب
بيان من #القاعدة لأسرة الأسير وارن وينشتاين
justpaste.it/Shamikh1
pic.twitter.com/aD69gznElo
#Warren_Weinstein
#JamesFoley

Timelines Notifications Messages Me

20.6K FOLLOWERS

Sanafi al-Nasr

Profile

سنافي النصر
@Snafialnasr

1,204 TWEETS 275 FOLLOWING 19.2K FOLLOWERS

Follow

سنافي النصر @Snafialnasr 31m
الدولة تعتبر الفصائل الإسلامية منافسة لها في مشروعها لذلك تعادىها أكثر من العلمانية كما أن آل سعود يعادون الإسلام السياسي ويعتبرونه منافسا لهم

retweeted سنافي النصر

الناشط خالد شعبان @Khaled_qah... 1h
لا يمكن وصف مستوى الانحطاط الذي وصل إليه

Timelines Notifications Messages Me

19.2K FOLLOWERS

Ansar al-Sharia

Profile

أنصار الشريعة بليبيا
@AnsarShariaa_ly

244 TWEETS 0 FOLLOWING 16.6K FOLLOWERS

Follow

أنصار الشريعة بليبيا @AnsarSh... 12h
الشيخ المجاهد / محمد الزهاوي - حفظه الله -
يتقدم صفوف المجاهدين في
#غزوة ادخلوا عليهم الباب .
23 رمضان 1435 هـ
pic.twitter.com/DQgR5GwhVT

أنصار الشريعة بليبيا @AnsarSh... 12h
الشيخ المجاهد محمد الزهاوي برفقة القائد الميداني

Timelines Notifications Messages Me

16.6K FOLLOWERS

When IS declared its caliphate — kicking off an unprecedented competition for dominance in the Global Jihad movement — the stars had also aligned for al-Baghdadi online. Especially in spaces of the Internet like the one managed by Twitter.

During the Arab Spring, the Muslim world discovered that social media could be used as a powerful tool to organize individuals and coordinate activities offline. These activities included protests in Egypt, assaults on government forces in eastern Libya, and, later, assaults on Western governmental personnel across Libya.

By 2014, al-Qa'ida had significantly increased its utilization of social media. On the slide you can see screenshots of Twitter accounts used to distribute links to propaganda by al-Qa'ida's as-Sahab media foundation, which produces content featuring al-Qa'ida's senior-most leaders, messages from Sanafi al-Nasr, a now deceased leadership figure in the group of senior al-Qa'ida operatives dispatched to Syria whom US officials refer to as the "Khorasan Group," and messages from the al-Qa'ida-affiliated Ansar al-Sharia Libya, whose operatives were reportedly involved with the 9/11 attacks of 2012 in Benghazi. As you can see, the followings for these accounts make many members of Congress who use Twitter green with envy.

Indeed, an absence of policies developed by social media companies to more effectively deter terrorist elements from exploiting social media platforms to distribute propaganda, or directly engage with individuals around the world has bolstered IS's influence capabilities.

لا إله إلا الله
الله أكبر

WE'LL
ENTER YOUR KIDS' AND FAMILY'S
BRAIN
AND MAKE THEM
ISLAMIC STATE
SUPPORTERS

A S A W I R T I M E D I A

209

★ 13

The Islamic State is now managing the most aggressive and, I would argue, effective influence operation of any terrorist group in history. The full extent of what the Islamic State is doing in social media to support this influence operation is too dynamic to cover in its entirety during the time I've been allotted. Meanwhile, among the focus areas of this multifaceted influence operation which are of key concerns to counterterrorism practitioners, and which are relevant to the issues I've been asked to discuss with you are perceptions management, recruitment and incitement.



KHILAFAH DECLARED



THE WORLD HAS DIVIDED INTO TWO CAMPS


Amirul-Mu'minin said: "O Ummah of Islam, indeed the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present:

The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy – the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the jews."

DABIQ 1 (JULY '14)



To manage perceptions effectively among Salafi-Jihadist elements, IS must demonstrate it is focused on action and results. The claim it has restored a caliphal model of governance on so-called "historically Muslim lands" galvanized many elements of the Global Jihad movement. For IS claims to have achieved the result which all members therein are striving to bring about. As you can see, not only the content, but also the production quality of its propaganda materials demonstrates that it is a priority for IS to build perceptions that its claim to have restored a caliphate is credible.



This claim was effectively twofold: Firstly, IS was announcing it is governing territories in a manner it says are consistent with the models provided by Mohamed, his companions, and the Salaf. Secondly, in accordance with the model provided by the Salaf, IS will strive to expand its territorial holdings throughout more than just the the Levant.

REMAINING AND EXPANDING

DABIQ 5 (NOV '14)

On the 17th of Muharram 1436, the world heard announcements from the mujāhidīn of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen, Sinai, Libya, and Algeria, pronouncing their bay'āt to the Khalīfah of the Muslims, Abū Bakr al-Husaynī al-Baghdādī (hafidhahullāh).


All of them announced uniformly:

“Allah – the Exalted – said, {And hold firmly to

the Khalīfah and support him, in obedience to Allah and the actualization of the unheeded obligation of the era.”

They then each gave their own piece of advice and wisdom concerning the obligation of unifying under the banner of the Khilāfah.

The mujāhidīn from Algeria advised the mujāhidīn everywhere:



“And we call upon every Muslim in every place to perform hijrah to the Islamic State or fight in his land wherever that may be.”

—Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi


As with any terrorist organization, IS propaganda materials are marketing tools used to influence behaviors among two key audiences: Individuals the group aims to terrorize, and individuals the group aims to derive support from. For IS, the latter category is the most important, because it requires membership growth in order to retain and expand control of territory. Indeed, maintaining credibility for the claim it has established a caliphate — a claim echoed with IS's very namesake — is essential. Therefore, it is important to identify key narratives contained in IS propaganda and social media posts which amplify these narratives. Further, it is important to examine what IS's narratives are intended to accomplish among prospective supporters.

In IS's case, after its claim that it has established a caliphate, the next-most important narrative is twofold: All (Sunni) Muslims are obligated to pledge allegiance to the caliph, and demonstrate their faith through actions called for by him. The next key narrative is that the action IS supporters are obligated to take to demonstrate their allegiance to al-Baghdadi, thus their faith, is to make a decision: Make hijrah (emigrating to the caliphate to help IS defend and expand it), or wage jihad at home against the terrorist group's enemies.

So if you see someone pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and then go on a shooting spree, they have not merely been inspired; (s)he is fulfilling a directive issued by the leadership of this terrorist group. For example, in a May 2015 address, al-Baghdadi proclaimed: “And we call upon every Muslim in every place to perform hijrah to the Islamic State or fight in his land wherever that may be.”

I mention this because, as law enforcement personnel, it is important for you to understand that, in terms of the public's interpretations of your comments about terrorists, “lone wolf” is ultimately an obfuscatory term. As a counterterrorism official at FBI's Washington Field Office put it in a discussion with me last September, “There has only been one ‘lone wolf’ terrorist: The Unabomber.” Indeed, an IS supporter who is trying to travel to Syria, or kill Americans at Joint Base Charleston has made two conscious decisions: One is to join a group, and the other is to participate in the activities called for by this group's leaders.

While the terrorists responsible for the San Bernardino attack may not have coordinated their activities with the Islamic State's officials, they were indeed directed by the Islamic State's leader to kill anyone whom they perceive to be working against his group. And the logic among Salafi-Jihadist elements that anyone whose democratically-elected officials have made it a policy to fight groups like al-Qa'ida is a legitimate target preceded the rebranding of al-Qa'ida's former Iraq branch as the Islamic State in 2014.



*“Allah says that the disbelievers
will never cease fighting you!
They will never cease fighting
you until they turn you back from
your religion if they are able to
do! So the mujahidin continue to
call you to one of two options:
Hijrah, or Jihad.”*

The “hijrah, or jihad” narrative is echoed throughout much of IS’s propaganda. In effect, IS is using its members to demonstrate why it is important for Muslims to heed this call versus just relying on al-Baghdadi to issue it. One interesting example of this narrative I located in my archive is found in a video distributed in 2014. The video was shot in Kobani and features an English-speaking terrorist from Canada known as Abu Anwar al-Canadi (deceased). Addressing Muslims in Canada, the US, and Europe, al-Canadi states: “Allah says that the disbelievers will never cease fighting you! They will never cease fighting you until they turn you back from your religion if they are able to do! So the mujahidin continue to call you to one of two options: Hijrah, or Jihad.”²³

23. Referenced in Michael S. Smith II. “DA’ISH: Hijrah Defines Our Future.” *DOWNRANGE*. 11 February 2015. Accessible via <http://insidethejihad.com/2015/02/daish-hijrah-defines-our-future/>

الحمد لله، والصلاة والسلام على رسوله محمد، وعلى



SCREENSHOT *KILL THEM WHEREVER YOU FIND THEM* (AL-HAYAT/IS)

With its propaganda, the Islamic State is also contrasting itself with al-Qa'ida in ways intended to endear itself to young aspirant jihadis. Whereas much of al-Qa'ida's propaganda typically features older figures in a static setting, such as a library,²⁴ the Islamic State's propaganda typically features young people delivering fiery remarks in the midst of warzones, or while dressed in tactical frock with rubble in the background (as was the case with al-Canadi). Sometimes their remarks are delivered while executing the group's enemies, as was the case with the al-Hayat video released earlier this year that features commentaries from participants in the November 2015 Paris plot, titled "Kill Them Wherever You Find Them."²⁵ In aggregate, these editorial choices serve to highlight that a war is underway, with the Islamic State's young fighters having achieved a dominant status in this war — a war which IS is fighting against better-equipped, technologically-superior governments. It is my assessment that the intended effect is for audiences to consider that the impossible (ie establishing a caliphate in the face of major world powers' opposition to their project) may just be inevitable. Indeed, the intended net effect of the Islamic State's propaganda is to build confidence in the group sufficient to stimulate action against governments which oppose it, and which, like al-Qa'ida, IS has branded the "enemies" of Islam.

Further, whereas groups like al-Qa'ida have argued they are not terrorist organizations, in this video, one of the terrorists who participated in the Paris plot explains, "So if you have sent your 'Hunter' fighter jets to bomb the Muslims, then know that the Islamic State has sent to you 'hunters' who thirst for the blood of the disbelievers, hunters who will not hesitate to slaughter you. For we are terrorists. We are the ones who terrorize the disbelievers. We are the ones who terrorize those who terrorize the Muslims."²⁶

24. Effective contrasting of IS and AQ propaganda in Daniel Byman and Jennifer Williams. "Al-Qaeda Vs ISIS: The Battle for the Soul of Jihad." *Newsweek*. 27 March 2015. Accessible via <http://www.newsweek.com/al-qaeda-vs-isis-battle-soul-jihad-317414> "For the most part, the Al-Qaeda core still mostly produces variants of the same tired old content it has been putting out since 2001— long videos featuring senior Al-Qaeda ideologues pontificating about various aspects of jihad and quoting extensively from the Koran."

25. "Kill Them Wherever You Find Them." Al-Hayat (Islamic State). January 2016. Full set of screenshots containing English-language subtitles at Michael S. Smith II. "On the Latest IS Video Re Paris." *DOWNRANGE*. 25 January 2016. Accessible via <http://insidethejihad.com/2016/01/on-the-latest-is-video-re-paris/>

26. Ibid.

DABIQ

7

1436 RABI' AL-AKHIR



DABIQ 7 (FEB '15)

FROM HYPOCRISY TO APOSTASY
THE EXTINCTION OF THE GENTLE

ISLAM IS THE RELIGION OF THE SWORD NOT PACIFISM



ABAAOUD 13 NOV '15 PARIS OP



INTERVIEW WITH

ABŪ 'UMAR AL-BALJĪK

Dabiq recently had the opportunity to interview Abū 'Umar al-Baljīkī (Abdelhamid Abaaoud) — a mujāhid being pursued by Western intelligence agencies for his jihad in Belgium. After his arrival to Shām, we said salām to the brother and presented him the following questions.

AMEDY COULIBALY JAN '15 PARIS OP

THE GOOD EXAMPLE OF ABŪ BASĪR AL-IFRĪQĪ

It is also important to understand why IS is orienting its human resources to conducting operations in the West. As mentioned, having the blood of Westerner's on one's hands is a key credential among Salafi-Jihadist elements. In al-Baghdadi's statements and other propaganda, IS has consistently stated it intends to punish the US and other Western powers for their military activities targeting their group. And matching words and deeds is crucial for IS.

In this slide we have screenshots of sections of *Dabiq* Issue 7, which was published online in February 2015. As you can see, IS propagandists are literally arguing against the common narrative espoused by Western political leaders that "Islam is a religion of peace." They are also portraying Amedy Coulibaly as an exemplar of the behaviors IS leaders intend for members of their support base to emulate. Weeks prior, Coulibaly executed attacks in Paris, France just after his friends the Kouachi brothers assassinated a *Charlie Hebdo* employee who was featured on an al-Qa'ida hit list contained in a 2013 edition of *Inspire*. Evidently, Coulibaly was trying to help steer the media's attention away from al-Qa'ida. (Note: An al-Qa'ida media liaison in Yemen (killed months later in a US strike) had promptly contacted journalists in the West to advise the *Charlie Hebdo* attack should be attributed to al-Qa'ida, not IS.) Indeed, Coulibaly had foreknowledge of the Kouachi brothers' plot. In order to ensure his acts of terrorism were attributed to IS in a manner intended to demonstrate that IS's support base was helping IS match words with deeds, Coulibaly's pledge of allegiance to IS and an explanation for his actions were posted online. Links to his "final will," which was published on JustPaste.it and elsewhere, were distributed in social media.

In terms of the group's determination to showcase that it is indeed matching words with deeds, the article published about Islamic State member Abdelhamid Abaaoud's intentions to conduct operations in Europe contained in this edition of *Dabiq* did just that. Months later, in November 2015, Abaaoud and a group of other IS members executed attacks in Paris — just as a variety of IS propaganda materials had claimed IS intended to do.

It is important to consider that the example set by Coulibaly, along with the attacks executed in Paris, may reflect a deliberate effort to demonstrate IS is out al-Qa'idaing al-Qa'ida by doing precisely what al-Qa'ida has called for its support base to do in the West.

In Coulibaly's case, he was almost certainly leveraging instructions provided in the Winter 2014 edition of AQAP's magazine *Inspire* to generate awareness of which group his acts of terrorism should be attributed to, thereby increasing media coverage of that group. These instructions were provided in an article concerning

DABIQ

ISSUE 7

1436 RABI' AL-AKHIR



DABIQ 7 (FEB '15)

FROM HYPOCRISY TO APOSTASY
THE EXTINCTION OF THE GENTLE

ISLAM IS THE RELIGION OF THE SWORD NOT PACIFISM



ABAAOUD 13 NOV '15 PARIS OP



INTERVIEW WITH

ABŪ 'UMAR AL-BALJĪK

Dabiq recently had the opportunity to interview Abū 'Umar al-Baljīkī (Abdelhak Abaaoud) — a mujāhid being pursued by Western intelligence agencies for his role in Belgium. After his arrival to Shām, we said salām to the brother and presented him the following questions.

AMEDY COULIBALY JAN '15 PARIS OP

THE GOOD EXAMPLE OF ABŪ BASĪR AL-IFRĪQĪ

what al-Qa'ida branded the "Global Lone Jihad Movement." Accordingly, terrorists executing attacks to help al-Qa'ida punish its enemies should do things to make the public aware who the attacks should be attributed to, by such means as using a time-delayed e-mail to notify others people of an attacker's motives. Also in this edition of *Inspire*, France was listed among al-Qa'ida's top targets, alongside the UK and US.

Certainly, if the Islamic State wishes to make al-Qa'ida appear like it is more inclined to talk about executing attacks targeting Westerners than operationalizing plots in the West, one way to achieve this is to execute attacks which al-Qa'ida has called for, but has not pulled off. Indeed, when you consider the targets selected for the 13 November attacks IS executed in Paris, it is noteworthy that, in the Spring 2014 issue of *Inspire*, al-Qa'ida called for attacks in the US, France and the UK targeting sporting events, cultural institutions like the Louvre, as well as densely populated facilities popular among tourists like hotels. On Friday the 13th, IS operatives targeted a sporting event attended by the president of France, whom I believe they intended to assassinate, visitors of a cultural facility (ie the Bataclan) during a concert, a café and two restaurants known to attract tourists. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that, in his final messages before his demise, bin Ladin repeatedly threatened France. In addition, according to a French intelligence report, an individual linked to al-Qa'ida's network in Gaza known as Abu Mohamed al-Ansari called for an attack targeting the Bataclan concert hall in 2009.²⁷

27. Confidential source.



FBI Washington Field ✓

@FBIWFO

+ Follow

#FBI Director Comey: no specific, credible threat to #DC. ISIL propaganda is not "credible intelligence." [twitter.com/FBI/status/667...](https://twitter.com/FBI/status/66744221802180608)



FBI @FBI


#FBI Director Comey and AG Lynch address the media about the current threat environment @TheJusticeDept

RETWEETS

35

LIKES

28



8:40 AM - 20 Nov 2015



Washington Field ✓

the official FBI's Washington
Twitter. To submit a tip online,
[gov](https://www.fbi.gov)

So, respectfully, I disagree with FBI Dir Comey's position that IS propaganda is not "credible intelligence," as he stated days after the November 13, 2015 attacks in Paris.²⁸



ابومجاهد العدناني is#
@grand20018



@MousaAlomar

JORDANIAN PILOT MU'ATH AL-KASEASBEH



12/24/14, 3:30 AM



شؤون عربية سنية، العزاوي Reply to

AMEDY COULIBALY JAN '15 PARIS OP



NOTE: QUOTING BIN LADIN



KOUACHI BROTHERS

If there is no check on the freedom of your words,

then let your hearts be open to the freedom of our actions.



@bakoon7 النصر المقدسية

Al-Sheikh: Usama Bin Laden (RA)

#من_مشاركاتكم

#تصميم إهداء إلى شهداء

#هجوم فرنسا ثأراً لرسول الله تقبلهم الله

#الدولة الإسلامية...

Influential figures in the Global Jihad movement, particularly al-Qa'ida leaders and clerics which serve as al-Qa'ida enablers like Mohamed al-Maqdisi of Jordan, have rejected IS's most important claim — that it has established a caliphate. Ultimately, they are trying to undermine IS's influence capabilities by diminishing the perceptibility of IS's claims about its accomplishments and what it intends to do next as credible.

To counter this, IS is rigorously demonstrating in social media that it is achieving a variety of results in ways intended to generate an aura of momentum, while also showcasing it is more capable of punishing Salafi-Jihadists' enemies than al-Qa'ida.

On this slide is a screenshot of an IS propagandist posting news that the group had downed a Jordanian fighter jet, and captured its pilot, Lt Mu'ath al-Kaseasbeh, in December 2014. Think about that for a minute. How many fighter jets has AQ shot down? News of this feat was amplified in the media when, early in 2015, IS published online a video titled "Healing the Believers' Chests" that documented the immolation of Lt al-Kaseasbeh.²⁹

Also on this slide is a tweet from an IS propagandist concerning the acts of terrorism executed in France by Coulibaly. As you can see, the propagandist is elevating Coulibaly's stature in relation to that of the Kouachi brothers. In addition, the propagandist has invoked a statement from bin Ladin in a manner intended to demonstrate that IS members are now stewarding the jihad he charted, with al-Qa'ida having been steered of course by its current leader. This position was firmly articulated in the seventh issue of *Dabiq*, and has been echoed throughout much of IS's propaganda.

In addition, I've included a screenshot of a tweet showcasing caravans of pickup trucks loaded with heavily armed terrorists racing through the desert — a familiar image intended to portray IS as a group on the move.

29. Video summary and screenshots available via Michael S. Smith II. "DA'ISH: Healing the Believers' Chests." *DOWNRANGE*. 3 February 2015. Accessible via <http://insidethejihad.com/2015/02/daish-healing-the-believers-chests/>



aaaaaaaaaaa1

@abdalziz9955


2 FOLLOWING

37 FOLLOWERS

Tweets

Media

in reply to @Jfyftut



aaaaaaaaaaa1 @abdalziz9955 5h


توي قتل جندي ال
سلور فيديو حمله قبل يحذفونه تكفمقتل
جندي سعودي حمله

sendvid.com/a03hvpv2r بسرع



aaaaaaaaaaa1 @abdalziz9955 5h

توي قتل جندي ال



Following

104 عبدالرحمن المهاجر

@ksiauhagat34625

703 FOLLOWING

489 FOLLOWERS

Tweets

Media

Favorites

The announcement of one's allegiance to al-Baghdadi via the Internet for the purpose of attributing an act of terrorism to the Islamic State was not a precedent set by the terrorists responsible for the San Bernardino attack. As noted, Amedy Coulibaly's pledge of allegiance to IS was posted online.

This example has been followed by other IS supporters than those responsible for the attack in California. For example, in Saudi Arabia last September, two brothers kidnapped one of their relatives who had recently joined a branch of the Kingdom's security services, drove him out into the desert, filmed his execution — with the executioner proclaiming the act of terrorism was committed to demonstrate support for al-Baghdadi — promptly posted the video online using a mobile device, and then tweeted a link to it in a manner intended to capture the attention of the manager(s) of a popular Twitter account used to distribute links to IS propaganda. The pair proceeded to go on a rampage, stopping at two police stations where they killed and wounded several other people before they were hunted down and killed by Saudi authorities. The screenshot in the lower right is of an IS propagandist-managed Twitter account, which used a screenshot of their execution film as the banner image for the account.

What does this have to do with Americans? The answer is: They are providing a model for behavior for the world to see.



Home



Notifications



Messages



Me



AlHayat Media Center
@al_hayat_en




#AlHayat_Media presenting:
Dabiq (Magazine) Issue #1:
writeurl.com/publish/ujzjvs...



7/5/14, 9:02 AM

458 RETWEETS 200 FAVORITES



Reply to AlHayat Media Center 127



Donald J. Trump ✓
@realDonaldTrump

Heading to South Carolina,
really big crowd! Will be back in
New Hampshire tomorrow.
[#MakeAmericaGreatAgain](#)

2/5/16, 4:12 PM

1,736 RETWEETS 6,041 LIKES



Neil Turner @NeilTurner_ 2/5/16
@realDonaldTrump
youtube.com/watch?v=1516WV... is the best man for


Reply to Donald J. Trump

Let's take a look at the early phase of IS's use of social media. The screenshot on the left is of the English-language Twitter account used to distribute al-Hayat-produced propaganda in July 2014. The account had a following of a couple thousand accounts. Notice the number of retweets for this post, which provided a link to the first edition of *Dabiq*: 458 retweets.

On the right, you can see a recent tweet posted by Donald Trump concerning a forthcoming trip to South Carolina. Mr. Trump's Twitter following was roughly 6 million at the time of this post. The number of retweets: 1,736.

We can see that, on a per account basis, early on, IS's audience on Twitter was more inclined to promote important announcements by retweeting them in July 2014 than Donald Trump's audience was earlier in February 2016. Or perhaps an IS member had created, say, 300 accounts that were used to retweet the link to *Dabiq* Issue 1 to make it look like a popular topic. This, to generate a perception of likeability in social media among young, impressionable audience members.


Unread Messages



عصفوره متطرفه®

الـ FoxNews "رئيس الـ CIA السابق: الدولة الإسلامية تكسب جماعات مبايعة أكثر مما فعلت القاعدة في أي وقت مضى"

وقال، ان الدولة الإسلامية الآن



IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY

In an issue of "TIME" magazine released shortly after the blessed attacks in Paris, Michael Morell – former deputy director of the CIA who also served twice as its acting director – wrote an article titled "What Comes Next, And How Do We Handle It? – ISIS Will Strike America." Despite a fatal flaw in its title – as Islamic State knights have struck in America on numerous occasions before the magazine's release including the attacks executed by the martyrs Usaama bin Laden, Zale Thompson, Elton Simpson, Nadir Soofi, and others, may Allah accept them all – we present this article below. Morell's preposition was emphasized swiftly by two brave heroes of the Khilafah: the martyred husband and wife, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, may Allah accept them both. Yes indeed, the Islamic State had struck once again in the American homeland.

Nonetheless, the crusader Michael Morell had the following to say in his article:

Ok, as an aside: No, I have not found any noteworthy examples of Donald Trump's comments being converted into recruitment tools by IS in the manners which both Hillary Clinton and SITE Intelligence Group founder Rita Katz claimed they have been.³⁰ But, in recent weeks, remarks issued by Hillary Clinton's pal former Deputy CIA Dir Michael Morell concerning IS's growth outpacing al-Qa'ida's were used for this purpose. On the left is a screenshot of a Telegram Messenger channel managed by the IS propagandist known as Asfura. As you can see, Morell's remarks are being highlighted. The screenshot on the right highlights that, several weeks later, two pages in the latest edition of *Dabiq* were dedicated to touting Morell's description of IS as a major threat to US interests.

30. "ISIS didn't feature #Trump in a video, but ISIS supporters/recruiters have used Trump's rhetoric to promote ISIS' ideas & agenda. #Hillary." @Rita_Katz (Twitter). 20 December 2015. Accessible via https://twitter.com/Rita_Katz/status/678612336899420161



“calumwut

1. #amnesia behind the scenes

2. #peachiitalk

3. #3YearsOfWMYB

4.#FCKB04

5.#DHDL

6. Wochen Ferien

8. Zuschauer pic.twitter.com/oyxGqJ8k80”



#مؤسسة السحاب

بيان من #القاعدة لأسرة الأسير وارن وينشتاين

justpaste.it/Shamikh1

pic.twitter.com/aD69gznElo

#Warren_Weinstein

#JamesFoley

A Message from Qa'eda al-Jihad to the
Family of the Prisoner, W. Weinstein

بيان من جماعة قاعدة الجهاد لأسرة الأسير وارن ويستباين

[illegible]

مؤسسة السحاب Reply to

Obviously, one way the Islamic State rapidly expanded its audience of prospective supporters was through activities undertaken to elicit interest in the group among news organizations. Notable among the terrorist organization's efforts to garner ongoing coverage of its activities — which has helped it to eclipse the specter of al-Qa'ida — were the beheadings of journalists and aid workers from countries whose governments are committed to fighting IS.

In a piece published by *The Washington Times* in the fall of 2014, titled “When Terrorists Compete, Americans Lose,”³¹ I noted that, in social media, it was clear the attention IS was generating from major news organizations via its brutal treatment of hostages from the West was making al-Qa’ida nervous. As is highlighted in this slide, an extraordinary amount of attention had been paid to the Islamic State’s video documenting the beheading of freelance journalist James Foley. Indeed, because the topic was trending so high in Twitter, al-Qa’ida propagandists were basically trying to convert interest in the Islamic State’s treatment of a hostage into interest in their own treatment of a hostage. This, by using the popular hashtag term #JamesFoley to draw attention to a message they released concerning al-Qa’ida’s American hostage, Warren Weinstein, who was reportedly killed months later in a US drone strike.

31. Michael S. Smith II. "When Terrorists Compete, Americans Lose." *The Washington Times*. 1 September 2014. Accessible via <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/1/when-terrorists-compete-americans-lose/>

Asawirti Media (Unofficial Islamic State Propaganda)



1 Jan – 10 Feb '16

MORE THAN 45 ACCOUNTS

Meanwhile, in social media, IS influence operations agents have established an aggressive behavioral model for the group's global support base. This is not just about promoting IS propaganda and amplifying narratives therein. Part of this behavioral model is a demonstration of the force of human will, albeit in a virtual realm. Specifically, they are demonstrating a refusal to relent in the face of opposition from a government which is widely perceived as the dominant force in the cyber domain. After all, the USG did create the Internet. Right?


To this end, IS members and supporters tout as credentials the number of times their accounts have been suspended by Twitter. This is often done by including the number of accounts they have managed in their Twitter handles, or by tweeting screenshots of their previous account upon being suspended by Twitter.

Produced on 1 January 2016, the left and center screenshots on this slide are of the primary Twitter account managed by Asawirti Media, an unofficial IS propaganda production group which has furnished some of the most provocative anti-American videos you'll find IS supporters distributing links to in social media. This was the 374th Twitter account opened by the group. Notice that it had amassed a following of nearly 10,000 accounts. Now, if you're thinking, "Well, how long was it opened?" my answer is: A very small window of time. Days earlier, on 28 December 2015, Asawirti was on its 359th account. So we can see that this Islamic State supportive propaganda machine has brand equity sufficient to amass followings into the thousands within hours of opening an account. Indeed, as I noted on my Twitter account, on 25 December 2015, Asawirti opened its 357th account, which attracted more than 7,000 followers in a 14-hour window of account activity that comprised 146 tweets (that does not include retweets).

The screenshot on the right was produced 10 February 2016, just after the 419th Twitter account managed by Asawirti Media was suspended. Since 1 January, Asawirti's primary Twitter account has been suspended more than 45 times. As you can see, with this new account, Asawirti announced its creation of a new Telegram Messenger channel.

THE NEW FRONTIER???

Islamic State Telegram Messenger Channels



The screenshot on the left highlights that, within a few hours, roughly 1,500 Telegram Messenger users had joined the newly-created Asawirti Media channel. So, I'm guessing some of you are thinking, "Well, I'm sure that will get shut down soon." And, based upon the extensive research that I and my associates with both Ghost Security Group and ControlSec have been conducting concerning the Islamic State's use of Telegram's channel functionality, you're right. Telegram has been more aggressive than Twitter with its efforts to deter terrorists' uses of its technology as a tool to broadcast propaganda and, as you can see in the center screenshot of an IS "Technical Library" Telegram channel, instructions for doing things like hacking Samsung cell phones, or manufacturing explosives. Obviously, as the FBI awarded Samsung the contract for cell phone needs when Apple refused to offer an acceptable price for its iPhones in recent years, there are probably some special agents here today who may want to check their security settings.

The screenshot on the right is of the 12th Telegram Messenger channel established on 8 February 2016 by the IS propagandist known as Asfura. This example highlights that the pattern discernible in Telegram is one similar to the pattern of behavior discernible in Twitter: Maintaining presences within spaces of the Internet where people around the world can connect with IS is a priority for the terrorist group. Plus, as mentioned, IS members are establishing a model of online behavior intended to encourage their terrorist organization's support base to persist with their uses of social media, even when social media companies take action to discourage abuses of their technologies by terrorists and their supporters.

Many with

THOUSANDS OF FOLLOWERS



تقني الدولة الإسلامية
@T4_SUPPORT

SOFTWARE ENGINEER FOR TECHNICAL
SUPPORT TELEGRAM : SOFTWARE_ENG
THREEMA : SR444TAW

250 FOLLOWING 1,023 FOLLOWERS

Tweets Media Favorites

تقني الدولة الإسلامية @T4_SUP...
لهم وبحمدك أشهد أن لا إله إلا أنت
بنا وأتوب إليك

تقني الدولة الإسلامية @T4_SUP... 1h



While al-Qa'ida has long used social media to augment its ideological propagation work, it is important to note that — unlike the Islamic State — al-Qa'ida does not require a massive influx of new members to sustain its operations in the near term.³³ Another factor that should be taken into consideration when comparing these groups' activities on social media is al-Qa'ida's emphasis on operational security. Indeed, the Islamic State's aggressive use of social media demonstrates a much higher quotient of risk tolerance, as intelligence services often can locate individuals who are active on the Internet.

Yet the Islamic State is not trying to create martyrs for the cause via encouragement of its support base's rampant abuses of social media platforms to help promote IS. It needs these individuals to at least try to do things to demonstrate their allegiance to IS offline.

So, in 2015, the Islamic State began establishing Twitter accounts and Telegram Messenger channels which are dedicated to informing the group's support base of best practices for online operational security. Among the technologies the group encourages its supporters to utilize are VPNs that help mask the location of one's device when one is online or transmitting e-mails. As you can see in the screenshot in the foreground, the group also promotes uses of various encrypted texting and voice apps. While these apps provide the robust level of encryption you would find with PGP and older tech, they're all much more user friendly, and, in some cases, there is no acquisition fee.

33. See comments on this topics by Michael S. Smith II in "The ISIS Storm: America on Alert." Peacock Productions (NBC). Televised by The History Channel (November 2015). 21:00-21:11. Footage accessible via <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7HD7SqPoS0k>

DOWNRANGE

- LATEST
- AL-QA'IDA
- "FELLOW TRAVELERS"
- IKHWAN
- GLOBAL JIHAD
- TEHRAN & CO
- INSIGHT & ANALYSIS
- COMMENTARY
- ABOUT US
- CONTACT



DA'ISH MUSIC VIDEO 'FISABILILLAH' CALLS FOR ATTACKS IN THE WEST


Most of what I have covered thus far highlights how IS is using propaganda and social media to establish models of behavior, both online and off, for the group's support base. From traveling to Syria and Iraq to help the group maintain de facto control over population centers it claims to be governing, to killing individuals in the West, these actions all help the group achieve credibility for its most important claims. These claims are that it is presiding over a caliphate, and terrorizing what IS and other Salafi-Jihadist elements call Islam's enemies.



Yet what is also important to examine is this question: How does IS's leadership intend for all of this to influence perceptions among individuals in the West whom they aim to terrorize?

As I noted, social media platforms like Twitter, which the Islamic State's propagandists have occasionally referred to as an Islamic State wilayat (province), are among the most important tools used to manage this global influence operation. Particularly features of this influence operation aimed at creating security challenges for Western powers who refuse to resort to the sort of ground forces-intensive response to IS's activities in Syria and Iraq that would propel al-Baghdadi into the light of a Mullah Omar. A figure whose status in Salafi-Jihadist spheres as a defender of "historically Muslim lands" against "Zionist-Crusader" "occupiers" warranted pledges of allegiance to him from the likes of such terrorist icons as bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida's current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Titled "Fisabilillah," the lyrics of a music video released by the Islamic State in 2015 to highlight countries in which it wishes to execute terrorist attacks (ie Germany, France, the UK, Australia and the US) begin with the following refrain: "To the enemies of Allah: Where are your troops?/We can no longer wait."³⁴ Repeated throughout, these lyrics reveal that IS leaders had anticipated their terrorist group's actions would have prompted responses from the US and other Western powers which more closely resembled the response to the 9/11 attacks of 2001. Clearly, however, while publishing videos online which documented the beheadings of journalists and aid workers served to generate antipathy for the Islamic State among civilian audiences the world over, this has all yet to manifest in horrified Western civilian populaces demanding that their governments commit to a conventional war with this terrorist group.

34. Transcript in Michael S. Smith II. "DA'ISH Music Video 'Fisabilillah' Calls for Attacks in the West." *DOWNRANGE*. 14 April 2015. Accessible via <http://insidethejihad.com/2015/04/daish-music-video-fisabilillah-calls-for-attacks-in-the-west/>

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> ISLAMIC STATE IN WEST AFRIC

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2015

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2015

> TRANSCRIPT: AL-BAGHDADI'S I

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> AFG TALIBAN JUSTIFIES BEHE/

'SOLDIERS OF THE STOOGE REC

2015

Ultimately, it is important to understand that the Islamic State’s interest in expanding terrorist operations in the West is about more than being able to credibly claim it is punishing the so-called “enemies of Islam.” This is also about provoking responses from Western powers which can help the Islamic State to both recruit and stimulate interest in attacking its enemies the world over.

Indeed, it is almost certain al-Baghdadi views a ground war with the US as an opportunity to rapidly subsume the support bases of al-Qa’ida and other Salafi-Jihadist groups that are not yet aligned with IS. The Islamic State has often portrayed Western aggression as a driver of its growth, casting its supporters from the West in the light of defenders of the faith who point to their respective governments’ military activities targeting Muslims as reasons why other Muslims in the West should support IS.

Such was the case with various missives from participants in the November 2015 Paris plot featured in the al-Hayat-produced video “Kill Them Wherever You Find Them.” Addressing Europeans and Americans in the video, one of the terrorist responsible for the November 2015 attacks in Paris proclaims: “You, along with more than 70 other nations, formed a coalition to fight the Islamic State. But you will not be able to stop it. By Allah, this is just the beginning. And the more you wage war against the Islamic State, the more it will expand and the more Muslims will come and join it.”

Furthermore, a ground war with the so-called “enemies” of the faith in Sham (Syria) is an important item in the IS mythos. As is reflected with the title of the group’s publication *Dabiq*, IS leaders seek to imbue their now global audience with anticipation of a final showdown — an apocalyptic battle that shall occur between the faithful and Islam’s enemies in the fields surrounding Dabiq.



cedarsbyrola.com



لا اله الا الله



ISLAMIC STATE HACKING DIVISION

[+] Target: **United States Government And Military - The Head of The Crusader Coalition**

[+] Hack: **U.S Military And Government Emails, Passwords, Names, Phone Numbers and Location Information Leaked**

Peace Be Upon The One Who Follows True Guidance

O Crusaders, as you continue your aggression towards the Islamic State and your bombing campaign against the muslims, know that we are in your emails and computer systems, watching and recording your every move, we have your names and addresses, we are in your emails and social media accounts, we are extracting confidential data and passing on your personal information to the soldiers of the khilafah, who soon with the permission of Allah will strike at your necks in your own lands! *"So wait; we too are waiting"*

- Islamic State Hacking Division

Full Name / First Name	Last name	Department / Division	E-Mail	Password	City / State	Zip Code	Phone / Cell	
Ku'upolani	Ka'ahu	110th Military Police Company - US Army	ipo.kaahu@us.army.mil	ipo.KAAHU19f@	Colorado Spring	80913	(719) 544-0100	
jason	davis	1-63 cab - US Army	jason.davis4@us.army.mil	dragon4	fort riley	66442	(781) 889-0784	
Michael Hunter		200th MMC - US Army	michael.hunter@us.army.mil	chad71	AE	9054	1.14983E+13	
ST CLARENCE	AVERY	209TH ASB S-4 - US	st.clarence.avery@us.army.mil	stclark10	SCHOFIELD	90957	(951) 666-0100	


So just imagine what the impact on Americans' appetite for war might be if this scenario were to unfold: The next time IS hackers release target lists containing addresses and other information for officials from America's defense, intelligence, law enforcement and diplomatic communities, IS supporters are standing by to attack individuals and facilities — or residences — included on that list. (Yes, I can say with near certainty that more lists will be published online.)

This is a screenshot of the list of more than 1,000 USG personnel identified as targets by the Islamic State Hacking Division that was posted online in August 2015. The list contains individuals' names, respective employers (from CIA to FBI, SPAWAR to US Embassies), email addresses with corresponding passwords, physical locations, and phone numbers. A hacker named Ardit Ferizi has been charged with providing IS this list.

The statement published with the list reads: "O Crusaders, as you continue your aggression towards the Islamic State and your bombing campaign against the muslims [sic], know that we are in your emails and computer systems, watching and recording your every move, we have your names and addresses, we are in your emails and social media accounts, we are extracting confidential data and passing on your personal information to the soldiers of the khilafah, who soon with the permission of Allah will strike at your necks in your own lands! ..."

As you can see, I'm drawing your attention to the address for the site where the list was published online. Typically, IS will publish material like this using popular file-sharing sites like JustPaste.it or Archive.org, which has been a clearinghouse for terrorist propaganda for years. In this case, the Islamic State Hacking Division used software called Cloud Flare to mask where the list was located online. However, a group I collaborate with known as Ghost Security Group developed knowledge of how to work around this software (in certain cases) in order to identify where such material is hosted.

CyberCaliphate



you isis

U.S. Central Command

@CENTCOM

Official Twitter for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). *Follow/RT does not equal endorsement.

MacDill AFB, Tampa, FL

centcom.mil

Joined March 2009

TWEETS
3,672

FOLLOWING
1,268

Tweets Tweets &


U.S. Central Command

AMERICAN SOLDIERS, WE ARE
In the name of Allah, the
the CyberCaliphate under
while the US and its sate
we broke into your network
you'll see no mercy infid
with Allah's permission w
we won't stop! we know ev
U.S. soldiers! we're watch
Here's a part of confiden

<http://pastebin.com/y2spP7y9>



The comment "we are in your social media accounts" in the note provided with the list published by IS in August 2015 was in reference to the breach of USCENCOM's Twitter account early in 2015. Even if IS hackers were not responsible for this act, as has been suggested in various federal reports, the group's support base has touted this as one of many IS feats in the cyber domain.



The screenshot on the left is of the Twitter account used to distribute links to the list. As you can see, the manager(s) of this account included account names for kik and Wickr so that IS supporters could contact them directly. Also advertised was an e-mail address.

The screenshot on the right is of a Tweet which included the link to the list. As you can see, the link is to a mirror site, rather than the actual domain where the list was hosted. This Twitter account was suspended soon after this information was posted online.



On the left is a screenshot of the next Twitter account established by the Islamic State Hacking Division. On the right is a screenshot of a tweet from this account the day following the online publication of the list. As you can see, they are highlighting the list was still available online. In addition, they provided onlookers with names and corresponding details from the list in individual tweets.

I was alarmed to observe them highlighting the list had not been removed from the Internet. A day prior, I provided an FBI special agent assigned to the JTTF in South Carolina with the information concerning where the list was hosted. Apparently, the IS Hacking Division had hacked a WordPress site hosted in the US, and posted the material unbeknownst to the site owner. Operatives with Ghost Security Group who located the hosting location asked me for permission to block access to the site. However, a supervising agent in South Carolina advised he could not approve this activity as it would be conducted by unknown individuals versus me. As he put it, he could not provide consent for otherwise illegal activity, or OIA, to individuals whose identities are unknown to FBI. Further, he could not allow for me to function as a proxy for consent for OIA for the purpose of blocking access to this list.

I explained that the publication of this list and various other high-profile leaks highlight why operatives with Ghost Security Group were disinterested in having their names listed in government databases as Confidential Human Sources (ie hackers capable of breaching US systems are clearly willing to provide sensitive information to IS).

About a month later, an FBI official with Washington Field Office who has been involved with the case against Ardit Ferizi advised me that, if something like that list is posted online again, just have them block access. Of course, he would not put this feedback in writing for me.

Indeed, even within federal agencies, you will encounter conflicting perspectives on how to manage problems like this one as they arise.

AbuHussainAlBritani

@AbuHussain_18

Abu Hussain Al Britani - Telegram & Surespot: abuhussain3 - kik: abuhussain2 (brothers only)

1 FOLLOWING

150 FOLLOWERS

Tweets

Media

Favorites

AbuHussainAlBritani retweeted

fletcherbabb @fletcherbabb

2h

So that ISIS-looking leak seems legit. @DeptofDefense tells us they're "looking into it" wp.me/p5hvhT-7u6c my latest for @VentureBeat

5

5

UmmHussainBritaniya

@UmmHussain_16

◆ Zawii Abu Hussain Al Britani ◆ Hijrah

Fisabilillah ◆

Mosul

171 FOLLOWING

558 FOLLOWERS

Tweets

Media

Favorites

UmmHussainBritaniya retweeted

Muslimah @_Muslimah_OO1

1h

'ISIS leak HACKER'S GUIDE to hundreds of US military personnel'

The screenshot on the left is of the 18th Twitter account managed by Junaid Hussain, who was successfully targeted days later with a drone strike in Syria.³⁵ Hussain was reportedly designated a high priority target for the USIC due to his work encouraging IS supporters around the world to execute acts of terrorism targeting IS's enemies.³⁶ He was a British national of Pakistani descent. He was previously affiliated with one of the most active hacker groups whose members claimed affiliation with Anonymous, and he was jailed in the UK for hacking Tony Blair's accounts and posting his personal information online.



As you can see, Hussain, who had become a leadership figure in the IS Hacking Division, was touting that journalists had authenticated information contained on the list of USG personnel that Ardit Ferizi allegedly provided the IS Hacking Division. As you can also see in his Twitter account profile, he provided IS supporters his Telegram Messenger, Surespot and kik account details so that they could correspond with him directly. My research indicates he may have had a hand in a plot targeting British tourists and Jews in Djerba, Tunisia that was disrupted early in July 2015. His social media posts indicate he clearly had foreknowledge of the plot.

Why might he have tweeted something was coming "soon" in that case? Perhaps to demonstrate to his audience that he was indeed involved with IS's "external operations" division. Or perhaps to stimulate interest in conducting attacks among other individuals who wished to show their support for IS. Or perhaps to achieve both.

The screenshot on the right is of the 16th Twitter account managed by Hussain's wife, Sally Jones. As I noted earlier, Jones has been designated by Secretary of State John Kerry for her support of IS. In one of the earlier slides, I provided a screenshot that revealed where she was promoting the work of Anwar al-Awlaki. As you can see in this screenshot, she was promoting information about the list allegedly provided by Ferizi. As you can also see, in her account profile she was encouraging people to make hijrah. My assessment is that she included the term fisabilillah (for the sake of Allah) in allusion to the aforementioned music video that provided viewers insights of the types of plots IS wishes for its supporters to execute in the West.

35. Barbara Starr. "Prominent ISIS recruiter killed in airstrike." CNN. 28 August 2015. Accessible via <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/26/politics/isis-recruiter-targeted-in-airstrike/>

36. Dipesh Gadher. "British hacker is No. 3 on Pentagon 'kill list.'" *The Sunday Times*. 2 August 2015. http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article1588418.ece



As I noted in the documentary “The ISIS Storm: America on Alert” that aired on The History Channel last year, Ardit Ferizi had not simply (allegedly) provided information concerning USG personnel to the Islamic State; he also encouraged support for the terrorist organization.³⁷ Pursuant to his social media accounts’ linkages to IS social media networks a cyber operative (whom I have funneled information to federal officials for) began interacting with Ferizi last year. As these screenshots highlight, via Twitter’s Direct Message feature, Ferizi soon sent messages which encouraged the operative to make hijrah and work with IS in Syria or Iraq. Some of his messages concerned the alleged use of one of Saddam Hussein’s bunkers as a secure facility by IS members. While his messages may have been insincere, he certainly did not discourage the operative’s stated interest in joining IS.

Do I know for certain that Ferizi pledged allegiance to IS? No. But his activities in social media indicated he was regularly interacting with IS members and supporters. Indeed, according to charges file against him, he is, in the very least, an IS facilitator.

37. “The ISIS Storm: America on Alert.” Peacock Productions (NBC). Televised by The History Channel (November 2015). 23:28-23:53. Footage accessible via <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7HD7SqPoS0k>



FEATURE:
HIJRAH FROM
**HYPOCRISY
TO SINCERITY**

SPECIAL:
FOLEY'S
BLOOD IS ON
OBAMA'S HANDS

الخلافة الدولة الإسلامية هجرة الخلافة ابو بكر البغدادي في سبيل الله

Now, let's stop for a minute and consider one factor which can make it easy for the Islamic State to elicit support, and direct activities in the West — all in plain sight via social media, and in ways which make it difficult for many law enforcement personnel to see it coming.

As is well known, much of this terrorist organization's propaganda, to include social media posts, is presented in a variety of languages. Indeed, the group is aiming to achieve global impact, and the fastest way to do that is to concurrently relay important messages in Arabic, English, French, German, Russian, Turkish, Japanese, Indonesian — the list of languages I've seen IS propagandist employ goes on and on.

Meanwhile, although Muslim converts are a target audience — roughly 40 percent of the individuals residing in the US who have been charged with attempting to support the Islamic State have been identified as converts — data indicates the Islamic State has attracted support from more lifelong Muslims residing in the West than converts. In many instances, these people will be proficient with Arabic. And, as the Islamic State's recruiters are keenly aware, most law enforcement personnel in the US are not proficient with Arabic.

Why would IS's "external operations" operatives seek to coordinate attack plots with individuals in the West? Because they are keenly aware that this will make it difficult for officials to deny an attack is linked to the terrorist group, while increasing fear among Americans concerning IS's capabilities to mobilize attacks in the US. The same effect is achieved when individuals make hijrah after interacting with IS members located in Syria and elsewhere online.

Does anyone here read Arabic? On the slide, there are several Arabic terms and a very well known name. If you saw a resident of your community who posts message in Arabic on social media frequently posting messages that contain what you see on the screen, what would you think?

Translations:

Caliphate
Islamic State
Hijrah
Caliph
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
Fisabilillah

DOWNRANGE

- LATEST
- AL-QA'IDA
- "FELLOW TRAVELERS"
- IKHWAN
- GLOBAL JIHAD
- TEHRAN & COM
- INSIGHT & ANALYSIS
- COMMENTARY
- ABOUT US
- CONTACT






DA'ISH MUSIC VIDEO 'FISABILILLAH' CALLS FOR ATTACKS IN THE WEST

Search...

RECENT POSTS

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25, 2016
- > ON THE ZAWAHIRI 'WANTED DE
AND OTHER MATTERS August 23,
- > ISLAMIC STATE IN THE SINAI E)
ALLEGED SPY June 8, 2015
- > ISLAMIC STATE IN WEST AFRIC
SITREP, CLAIMS IT SHOT DOWN .
2015
- > TRANSCRIPT: AL-BAGHDADI'S I
MESSAGE May 14, 2015
- > AFG TALIBAN JUSTIFIES BEHE/
'SOLDIERS OF THE STOOGES REG
2015

... Fisabilillah



In addition, Twitter has introduced a variety of tools that make Twitter work for the Islamic State. On this slide you'll see what I see in a common day's work monitoring the Islamic State's activities on Twitter: A suspended account; a suspended account; a suspended account; and, when I click Follow on a popular account managed by an IS propagandist, Twitter provides me with a short list of accounts that either have linkages to this account's network, or whose posts contain similar content. As you can see, the notice reads, "You might also want to follow."



Rukmini Callimachi ✓

@rcallimachi

+ Follow

This is the reaction you get from @twitter when you try to flag a virulent ISIS account to them:

content reported and are unable to take action given that we could not determine a clear violation of the Twitter Rules (<https://twitter.com/rules>) surrounding abusive behavior. We're happy to revisit our decision if circumstances change or if you can provide additional context. If you have additional information to share that would improve our understanding of the situation, please send it our way.

Although there will be no action taken at this time, there are tools you can use that are designed to help you control what you see and what others can see about you on Twitter. This help article lists those tools as well as information about how to use them:

RETWEETS

230

LIKES

144



7:21 AM - 8 Dec 2015

As this screenshot highlights, as of December 8, 2015, Twitter was still having a difficult time determining if an account is managed by an IS supporter. Even when Rukmini Callimachi, a journalist who covers the Islamic State's activities for *The New York Times*, reported such an account to Twitter.

Rukmini is knowledgeable enough about the Islamic State's activities in Twitter to identify their accounts. Particularly when, as was the case in this instance, an account is being used to harass her due to her work exposing things like IS's sex slave trade.

Here, we see Rukmini tweeting a screenshot of the note Twitter sent to explain why they would not suspend the account she had reported.³⁸

38. @rcallimachi (Twitter). 8 December 2015. Accessible via <https://twitter.com/rcallimachi/status/674247340463550467>

1 Muslimah @Muslimah_9_11 · 2h
Any group or people who fight to replace Shariah w/man-made laws is an apostate. Anyone allying w/ Kuffar to remove Shariah is an apostate.

1 Muslimah @Muslimah_9_11 · 3h
You don't invade lands, bomb the people, rape and torture them & then complain about the way they fight you back.

1 Muslimah @Muslimah_9_11 · 3h
If you think the Islamic State is "barbaric" in the way they fight you in war, the solution is simple, do not attack the Islamic State.

1 Muslimah @Muslimah_9_11 · 3h
The Kuffar always act shocked when they're attacked, pretending like they hadn't killed millions in Iraq alone. Arrogance.

1 Muslimah Retweeted @IHateSalafi · 3h
Poll: Between 63 million and 287 million ISIS supporters in just 11 countries. الحمد لله muslimstatistics.wordpress.com/2015/11/19/pew...

1 Muslimah @Muslimah_9_11 · 3h
US Attacks IS= California Attack
France Attacks IS= France Attacks
Russia Attacks IS= Plane Attacked

Hit the hornet nest, expect a swarm

1 Muslimah @Muslimah_9_11 · 3h
Please Follow & Share Our Sister
@233Asfura
@233Asfura
@233Asfura

1 Muslimah Retweeted @233Asfura · 5h
عصفورة من طرفها


كم ورحمة الله
حذف بفضل الله تعالى
233
@233
عصفورة
حمد



I called Rukmini to ask for the account handle so we could produce some screenshots. As you can see in these slides, the account handle is @Muslimah_9_11. As you can also see, this account's posts were clearly supportive of the Islamic State. As you can see, this account's manager(s) retweeted a tweet announcing the creation of the 233rd Twitter account managed by an IS propagandist I mentioned earlier, known as Asfura. And as you may recall seeing in an earlier slide, Sally Jones retweeted an example of the manager(s) of this IS social media personality known as Muslimah tweeting about the publication of the massive list of USG personnel and corresponding details in August 2015. Indeed, if you want to keep track of Sally Jones' latest Twitter accounts, keep track of Muslimah's accounts. Muslimah is slightly more active on Twitter, and part of Sally Jones' social media network.

A message
from the Islamic State to Jack Dorsey
You are fighting the Islamic State
by suspending the supporters accounts

You'll pay your life for this



In relation to IS's use of social media to help manage its global influence operation, Twitter is indeed the center of gravity. That Twitter has not been more aggressive with its efforts to address this situation is indeed ironic.

These screenshots highlight a variety of examples of IS propagandists threatening the founder of Twitter and a Twitter CEO. Two of them were included in one of my opening slides.

The terrorist organization has also called for attacks targeting Twitter's employees. For some time during 2015, the primary Twitter account used to highlight the activities of IS's Libya branch used artwork showcasing Jihadi John pointing a knife at Twitter's founder.

What if?

What If?

Last year, a young man residing in Florida who is not believed to be a sincere supporter of the Islamic State was charged with using social media to encourage Islamic State supporters to execute terrorist attacks in the US. He allegedly provided individuals whose social media profiles indicated they were sympathetic to IS with attack plot concepts, including the identification of specific targets.

Meanwhile, the number of Islamic State-related investigations in the US opened by FBI indicates IS is indeed realizing far greater successes with its efforts to stimulate interest in supporting the terrorist organization among individuals located in the US than al-Qa'ida. Indeed, there is hard evidence which reveals the Islamic State's members and supporters are successfully encouraging individuals in the US to demonstrate their support for this terrorist group by resorting to some form of action — be it emigrating to the so-called “caliphate,” or waging jihad at home.

Therefore, an interesting scenario to examine is this: Could sociopaths or elements hostile to the US, such as Iran's Qods Force, utilize social media to (a) identify individuals located in the US who appear sympathetic to IS, (b) convince these individuals they are IS external operations coordinators, (c) stimulate interest among such individuals in conducting certain acts of terrorism targeting specific individuals or institutions, and (d) utilize these unwitting individuals to mobilize such attacks?