Case 1:98-cr-01023-LAK Document 1535-1 Filed 03/12/14 Page 1 of 21

Document provided by Kronos Advisory's research division http://kronosadvisory.com/Kronos_US_v_Sulaiman_Abu_Ghayth_Statement.pdf

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

-1 of 21-



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/06/2013

SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH, Also Known As (AKA) ABU YOUSSEF, Date of Birth (DOB) December 14, 1965, Place of Birth (POB) Kuwait City, Kuwait was interviewed on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Gulfstream V aircraft while en route to the United States. Present during the interview were SA Michael S. Butsch, FBI, Deputy U.S. Marshal Brian T. McHugh, U.S. Marshals Service, and FBI Interpreter Nehad Abusuneima. Also present during the interview were FBI SA Alan D. Hupp and SA Louis P. Luciano Jr. Upon initiation of the interview, GHAYTH identified himself as SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH. After being advised of the nature of the interview and the identities of the interviewing agents, GHAYTH provided the following information:

Interviewer referred to GHAYTH as Sheikh SULAYMAN and GHAYTH stated that he was honored that interviewer would refer to him as a Sheikh, though he preferred to be called ABU YOUSSEF. GHAYTH stated that he understood and spoke English somewhat, though had not used it in awhile, so his English speaking skills were not that good. FBI Interpreter Nehad Abusuneima translated the entire interview from Arabic to English. During portions of the interview, GHAYTH appeared to understand the interviewers' questions prior to being translated from English into Arabic. GHAYTH stated that he studied English in Kuwait in school, though had not used it in awhile. After being advised that he was under arrest and that he was traveling back to the United States to face criminal charges, GHAYTH requested to contact his brother in Kuwait to notify him what was going on. Interviewer advised GHAYTH that he would have an opportunity to contact his brother in the future, but that it would not happen immediately. Interviewer provided GHAYTH an opportunity to ask any questions he had of interviewers. Prior to asking any questions, GHAYTH stated, "I am willing to tell you anything and will not hold back. I will be honest with you. Through your questions, I may have questions." Interviewer made it clear to GHAYTH that he could ask to take a break for food, water, to rest, pray or use the bathroom at any time and that the request would be granted. GHAYTH acknowledged that he understood.

GHAYTH was asked if he was aware of any threat/operation targeting the United States or any other area. GHAYTH advised that since April 23, 2003, he had been completely disconnected from the outside world in Iranian

Investigation on	03/01/2013	at	White	Plains	New	York,	United	States	(In Person	1)
File# 415A-NY-307616, 415A-NY-307616-302_U									Date drafted	03/06/2013
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Case 1:98-cr-01023-LAK Document 1535-1 Filed 03/12/14 Page 2 of 21 Document provided by Kronos Advisory's research division http://kronosadvisory.com/Kronos_US_v_Sulaiman_Abu_Ghayth_Statement.pdf FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

,On 03/01/2013 ,Page 2 of 21

custody until his arrest by Turkish authorities on January 13, 2013. GHAYTH advised that his proof of this would be the paperwork indicating a divorce from his first Kuwaiti wife while he was in Iranian custody. GHAYTH stated that he was only permitted to speak with his first wife twice while in Iranian custody. GHAYTH said that it was not until two years ago that he was allowed to make phone calls to his family in Kuwait every two to three weeks. After GHAYTH was released from Iran, he was attempting to find his way back to Kuwait, and in doing so, he was talking to his brother and other family members. GHAYTH stated that while being disconnected from the outside world for 12 years, it was very painful to not be allowed to communicate with his family. GHAYTH stated, "I am talking with honesty and I want to assure you that I know you are law enforcement and that I am not aware of any threats against the United States."

At 11:38PM Eastern Standard Time (EST) on February 28, 2013, GHAYTH was given his Advice of Rights, which were read in English and translated to Arabic. At 11:44PM (EST) GHAYTH waived his Miranda Rights and did not request an attorney be present during his interview. While Miranda Rights were being read to GHAYTH, he was nodding his head and understood everything that was being stated to him. GHAYTH was asked if he had any questions and he said that he did not. GHAYTH stated, "I have no problem with telling my story and answering your questions if you're an investigator."

GHAYTH advised, "You will hear things of Al Qaeda that you never imagined." GHAYTH stated that while he was in Kuwait, he had no affiliation with Al Qaeda, USAMA BIN LADEN, or any other member of his entourage. GHAYTH stated that he was never in contact with them and that all he knew of them was through the media. GHAYTH recalled that he knew of Al Qaeda to refer to others as "infidels" and compared their ideology to that of President Bush when he stated, "You are either with us or against us." GHAYTH stated that while he was in Kuwait, he grew up with the Muslim Brotherhood. GHAYTH was always interested in learning about ideological groups and jihadi movements. GHAYTH advised that he had a love of seeking more knowledge and that he felt a sense of adventure and discovery. In 1992, GHAYTH traveled to Bosnia for 25-30 days during his summer vacation to work for "relief services" that provided aid and then returned to Kuwait to his job as a religious instructor. GHAYTH stated that when the Taliban took power in Afghanistan, he took interest and had a desire to travel there.

GHAYTH first traveled to Afghanistan in June of 2001 for approximately 20 days and rented a house in Kandahar. During GHAYTH's first visit to Afghanistan, USAMA BIN LADEN heard that GHAYTH was there and immediately requested to meet with him. GHAYTH advised that Iranian and Turkish

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

,On 03/01/2013 ,Page 3 of 21

authorities were surprised by how quickly he met with USAMA BIN LADEN. GHAYTH stated that USAMA BIN LADEN learned of him as being a preacher in Kuwait and had seen a tape of him giving a speech. GHAYTH stated that he believed he met with USAMA BIN LADEN at "Complex Six" and during this brief meeting believed that USAMA BIN LADEN took a liking to him. GHAYTH advised that USAMA BIN LADEN was very easily influenced, especially when he thought he was dealing with a knowledgeable person.

GHAYTH advised that he was impressed with USAMA BIN LADEN's personality because he was very humble and spiritual. GHAYTH said that there is a crisis in the Islamic world today and Muslims are looking for leadership and they saw that in USAMA BIN LADEN. GHAYTH advised that his beliefs now are the same as when he first met USAMA BIN LADEN and that they had many conversations which showed they had differences.

After his June of 2001 visit, GHAYTH traveled back to Kuwait and in July of 2001, GHAYTH returned to Afghanistan with his family and rented a house in Kandahar. GHAYTH advised that there were two Al Qaeda training camps, "Al Matar", where USAMA BIN LADEN and other senior Al Qaeda leaders resided, and the "Dar Mawak" camp. GHAYTH advised that these training camps were led and financially supported by USAMA BIN LADEN. GHAYTH stated that he did not attend any military training at the camps, though was aware that trainees received weapons, explosives, and guerrilla tactics training. Interviewer asked GHAYTH about the Al Qaeda video depicting trainees running through an obstacle course with "monkey bars" and GHAYTH responded that this video was filmed at the "Al Matar" camp.

GHAYTH advised that Al Qaeda had a religious school in Afghanistan that USAMA BIN LADEN had requested GHAYTH teach at, though GHAYTH stated that he never got the opportunity to teach there. GHAYTH stated that this school, referred to as the "House of Pomegranates", was run by ABU HAFS AL MAURITANI. GHAYTH stated that there was a guest house across from the "House of Pomegranates" where the Al Qaeda camp trainees would stay. GHAYTH stated that USAMA BIN LADEN had asked him to give speeches at this guest house and at the training camps. GHAYTH did give some speeches at the training camps during this time period as requested by USAMA BIN LADEN. GHAYTH said that the purpose of the speeches was to provide spiritual advice for the young students during their training. GHAYTH stated that USAMA BIN LADEN requested that GHAYTH continue to give religious advice to the trainees because "military hardens the heart".

GHAYTH stated that USAMA BIN LADEN started to meet more frequently with GHAYTH and eventually asked him to join Al Qaeda. GHAYTH stated that because USAMA BIN LADEN knew GHAYTH was a good speaker and religious scholar and also wanted more people from the Gulf area in Al Qaeda, USAMA

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Case 1:98-cr-01023-LAK Document 1535-1 Filed 03/12/14 Page 4 of 21 Document provided by Kronos Advisory's research division http://kronosadvisory.com/Kronos_US_v_Sulaiman_Abu_Ghayth_Statement.pdf FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

,On 03/01/2013 ,Page 4 of 21

BIN LADEN wanted GHAYTH to be part of Al Qaeda. GHAYTH advised that when USAMA BIN LADEN asked him to join Al Qaeda, he stated that he did not want to join as an organization or party because he was sick of "parties". USAMA BIN LADEN then asked GHAYTH what his affiliation to Al Qaeda would be and GHAYTH stated that he was not a soldier, but was a preacher and teacher and could offer himself as a religious scholar and orator and that he was willing to accept a position as that for the Al Qaeda organization. GHAYTH said no to providing bayat to USAMA BIN LADEN, but gave a smaller bayat where they had come to a personal agreement that GHAYTH would do anything he could within his capabilities as a religious scholar and experienced orator to assist USAMA BIN LADEN and his organization. GHAYTH noted that USAMA BIN LADEN was not an officially sanctioned emir by the majority of Muslims in the world, so it would not be proper to swear bayat to him. GHAYTH said that he was nominated by others to be a spokesman for Al Qaeda, though he never asked for it. GHAYTH was asked why he didn't say no to the position. GHAYTH said that the position was not offered as a job and that he was asked to assist in religious matters, so he did. GHAYTH stated that he was close to USAMA BIN LADEN, but not a member of Al Qaeda.

GHAYTH stated that while he was in Afghanistan, he spent most of his time in Kabul and Kandahar. GHAYTH stated that prior to September 11, 2001, he had not heard of any specific plans to attack the United States, though he had heard people around the Al Qaeda training camps saying that "something big was going to happen." GHAYTH advised that only the Al Qaeda Council knew about the September 11, 2001, attack planning and that he was not aware of the specific attack. GHAYTH stated that MULLAH OMAR, leader of the Taliban, refused to attack the U.S. GHAYTH believed that USAMA BIN LADEN contributed to the downfall of the Taliban.

GHAYTH advised that he was in Afghanistan when Al Qaeda and AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI's group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, merged to form one group. GHAYTH was not at the merger ceremony because it took place in Kabul and he was in Kandahar, but USAMA BIN LADEN had announced the ceremony prior to it occurring and most of the people knew about it. GHAYTH believed that USAMA BIN LADEN did this for propaganda purposes and desired "big names" under his control. USAMA BIN LADEN also wanted to limit the dominance of the Egyptians in Al Qaeda by bringing in someone like GHAYTH who is from the Gulf region.

GHAYTH was asked how ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI became a religious leader within Al Qaeda. GHAYTH stated that in Mauritania, seeking religious knowledge is highly respected, and therefore, a religious scholar from Mauritania is very well respected. GHAYTH advised that no one had a bad thing to say about ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI. GHAYTH said that ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI brought his own people from Mauritania to Al Qaeda.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

,On 03/01/2013 ,Page 5 of 21

GHAYTH stated that while in Afghanistan his wife was pregnant and on September 5, 2001, he decided to take his wife to Pakistan for medical services. The medical services in Pakistan were not that good, so he instructed his wife to return to Kuwait. On September 8, 2001, GHAYTH traveled to Kabul. GHAYTH stated that on September 11, 2001, he was surprised to learn of the attacks on America. GHAYTH advised that the night of September 11, 2001, someone came to his house and told him that USAMA BIN LADEN wanted to meet with him. GHAYTH was brought to USAMA BIN LADEN's house where he met with USAMA BIN LADEN. USAMA BIN LADEN asked GHAYTH if he saw what had happened, GHAYTH said that he did, and USAMA BIN LADEN said that we did this operation. USAMA BIN LADEN reminded GHAYTH about their agreement that if Al Qaeda asked for GHAYTH's assistance, that GHAYTH would be willing to assist. GHAYTH stated that he and USAMA BIN LADEN agreed that GHAYTH would give speeches on behalf of Al Qaeda and USAMA BIN LADEN. During the same evening of September 11, 2001, USAMA BIN LADEN asked GHAYTH if he could give a speech about the events of September 11, 2001. GHAYTH stated that he believed that he was new to the field and that other people would be better for the job, but USAMA BIN LADEN requested that GHAYTH give the speech. GHAYTH agreed to do so. GHAYTH advised that USAMA BIN LADEN had previously issued religious communications prior to GHAYTH arriving in Afghanistan. USAMA BIN LADEN provided the bullet points of the speech GHAYTH was to give, and GHAYTH's role was to build and deliver a speech around those bullet points.

On September 12, 2001, GHAYTH traveled from Kabul to the Tougar (phonetic) region of Afghanistan to meet with USAMA BIN LADEN. USAMA BIN LADEN asked GHAYTH what he thought the reaction of the United States would be in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks. GHAYTH told USAMA BIN LADEN that if the United States proved that he was behind the attacks, they would ask for two things. GHAYTH told USAMA BIN LADEN that the United States would want to topple the Taliban regime and kill USAMA BIN LADEN. GHAYTH stated that the purpose of this meeting was to film a video about the September 11, 2001, attacks. GHAYTH said that other senior Al Qaeda members were present during this meeting to include ZAWAHIRI. GHAYTH stated, "As you have seen in my speech, USAMA BIN LADEN, AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI, and ABU HAFS AL MASRI were all present during the filming of this video." Interviewing agents showed GHAYTH a still photograph of this video (Video #1) and GHAYTH identified himself, sitting on the far left side of the photograph, as well as USAMA BIN LADEN, seated next to GHAYTH, ZAWAHIRI, seated on the opposite side of USAMA BIN LADEN, and ABU HAFS AL MASRI, seated on the far right side of the photograph. GHAYTH advised that Video #1 was filmed on the morning of September 12, 2001, and one can tell it was shot in the morning because of the appearance of the sunlight.

GHAYTH was asked why USAMA BIN LADEN asked him to assist Al Qaeda and

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Case 1:98-cr-01023-LAK Document 1535-1 Filed 03/12/14 Page 6 of 21 Document provided by Kronos Advisory's research division http://kronosadvisory.com/Kronos_US_v_Sulaiman_Abu_Ghayth_Statement.pdf FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

, On 03/01/2013 , Page 6 of 21

GHAYTH stated that USAMA BIN LADEN wanted to recruit more people from the Gulf region and that GHAYTH'S Kuwaiti citizenship and prominence as an orator and religious scholar would assist in doing this. GHAYTH stated that he later realized that many Al Qaeda members from Egypt were angry with him and jealous of him for his position as Al Qaeda spokesperson. GHAYTH advised that USAMA BIN LADEN had asked him to assist in three or four videos, which GHAYTH did, but after completing those videos, GHAYTH told USAMA BIN LADEN that he would no longer appear in any other videos. GHAYTH stated that the purpose of these videos was for them to be broadcast through the media for propaganda purposes. GHAYTH was asked if the purpose of these videos was to inspire others to join Al Qaeda. GHAYTH responded that it was not his (GHAYTH's) videos that initiated Al Qaeda's outreach to young Muslims, that the outreach started long ago, and GHAYTH referred to the time in Sudan.

GHAYTH advised that all of his videos were made within a month after the September 11, 2001, attacks. GHAYTH was asked about his videos in which he advised Muslims to avoid airplanes and high rises and was asked why he referenced airplanes and high rises in particular. GHAYTH said that USAMA BIN LADEN again provided the bullets for these videos, which had the specific reference to airplanes and high rises. GHAYTH built his speech around USAMA BIN LADEN's bullet points and incorporated the references to airplanes and high rises as requested by USAMA BIN LADEN. GHAYTH later suspected that the reference to airplanes had something to do with the shoe bomb plot involving RICHARD REID, however, these videos were shot prior to RICHARD REID's arrest and GHAYTH had no prior knowledge of the shoe bomb plot.

GHAYTH stated that after September 11, 2001, USAMA BIN LADEN was moving from one location to another in Afghanistan. GHAYTH stated that he (GHAYTH) was in hiding in Afghanistan until June of 2002. GHAYTH advised that after the U.S. invasion, his videos became "words without meaning". GHAYTH stated that when he left Afghanistan in June of 2002, he went to Pakistan for approximately ten days and was then smuggled into Iran.

GHAYTH said that as a preacher, he reflected changes on the ground in his speeches. A lot of preachers prior to September 11, 2001, spoke out against their rulers and became emotionally involved in their speeches. GHAYTH advised that he was never influenced by the ideology of USAMA BIN LADEN, but influenced by whatever evolving situation was occurring like in Chechnya or Bosnia. GHAYTH said it was unfair to judge a speech on one or two statements.

GHAYTH was asked about the book he wrote, "Twenty Guidelines on the Path of Jihad", and interviewers noted how much it conflicted with his post

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

, On 03/01/2013 , Page 7 of 21

September 11, 2001, videos and speeches. GHAYTH said that the book represents his beliefs now and what they were prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks. GHAYTH said that there was a huge misunderstanding regarding the concept of jihad and that this misunderstanding is that jihad is only used in the context of fighting and violence. GHAYTH said that it is unacceptable to limit jihad to one concept and does not agree it should only be used in the context of fighting or self defense. GHAYTH said that fighting, science, building, and spreading faith are all jihad.

GHAYTH stated that Muslims are attached to the Palestinian cause and are inspired by this. GHAYTH said that he is not against the American people and that they are "brothers in humanity". GHAYTH went on to say that the United States has done a lot of good things for humanity. He believes the problems are with American policy and not the people. GHAYTH truly believes that the U.S. has the right to protect its interests, but U.S. policies are double standards which have caused many problems for Muslims. GHAYTH advised that his speeches are so angry because of the Palestinian cause. GHAYTH said that it is very common to make mistakes when you don't fully think through what you are saying.

GHAYTH advised that after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian National Guard offered to allow all Arab families trapped in Afghanistan to come into Iran. GHAYTH said that this was offered to all Arabs in Afghanistan, not just Al Qaeda. GHAYTH learned of Iran opening up its borders from ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI, who was close with Iranian officials. GHAYTH said that some people went back to their home countries, but there were some who could not return to their home countries because they were wanted by the authorities in their home countries. Many of these people who were wanted in their home countries took the Iranians up on their offer and traveled to Iran. Anyone traveling back to their native country had to travel through Pakistan. GHAYTH stated that he did not travel back to Kuwait because he was stripped of his Kuwaiti citizenship.

GHAYTH stated that initially, news of the Arabs coming into Iran spread among the Iranian population and the Iranian population was not happy with this. GHAYTH heard that the Iranian President became aware of this situation and was planning to intervene, however, Iranian Intelligence took the matter into their own hands. Iranian Intelligence rounded up all the Arabs that had entered Iran in this first wave at their invitation, and deported them back to Pakistan. GHAYTH advised that he came in the second wave of Arabs that arrived in Iran. GHAYTH said that he was desperate and believed that he would be able to hide out in Iran. GHAYTH snuck into Iran with the help of both Baluchi Pakistanis and Iranian smugglers and Iran did

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

,On 03/01/2013 Page 8 of 21

not know he was there initially. GHAYTH stated that he was in hiding in Iran with a Sunni family for ten months prior to being arrested in Shiraz (phonetic).

GHAYTH said that he was arrested in Shiraz on April 23, 2003, along with SAIF AL ADL, ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI, and ABU KHAYR AL-MASRI. GHAYTH stated that he knew these individuals to be members of Al Qaeda prior to being arrested with them, but did not know them very well. They were all first jailed in an Iranian Intelligence building in Tehran (Iran Location #1) for approximately one year and eight months. GHAYTH stated that he did not know why he was arrested, never received any trial, and was never formally sentenced. GHAYTH said that this was a forced incarceration. During the first 50 days of incarceration he was placed in a single cell. During the next 50 days, he was paired with another prisoner in a cell. Following the second 50 days, GHAYTH was put together with the above mentioned Al Qaeda members with whom he was captured. Iranian officials at Iran Location #1 told GHAYTH that they (Iranians) were Intelligence Officers and that they knew that GHAYTH and his fellow detainees entered Iran illegally. GHAYTH argued that they should be deported, but was told that it was a political decision to hold them.

GHAYTH advised that while initially incarcerated, the Iranians were official and formal and treated them well. They never received any verbal or physical abuse and they were told that treating them well was a recommendation from their leadership. GHAYTH stated that they were never interrogated and were only asked simple questions during the first week of their incarceration. GHAYTH stated, "That's the politics of Iran, no lawyers, no charges, no rights."

GHAYTH advised that he was forbidden from any form of communication for the first four years of his incarceration and his first communication with his family was four years after his arrest. He was never permitted to send or receive letters and only within the last two years of his incarceration was he allowed to use a computer to browse the internet and send emails via the Iranian authorities (as described in more detail in the following pages). GHAYTH advised that there was no system of passing messages outside of where they were incarcerated.

After one year and eight months, they were moved to a military camp for approximately six months (Iran Location #2). GHAYTH said that Iran Location #2 was like a rest area for soldiers. Because the wives of SAIF AL ADL, ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI, and ABU KHAYR AL-MASRI, were causing problems where they were incarcerated, the Iranians allowed the wives to join their husbands at Iran Location #2. While incarcerated at Iran Location #2, they heard military training and anthems being sung. They

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

.On 03/01/2013 .Page 9 of 21

were in a 100m by 100m compound and free to go in and out of their individual apartments within the military compound. The compound also had a mosque and soccer field. GHAYTH stated that the compound was only comprised of the mentioned Al Qaeda members. GHAYTH said that they had no means of communication with the outside world while in Iran Location #2.

After six months in Iran Location #2, they were set up in apartment like housing without any windows in which they stayed for approximately four years (Iran Location #3). Iran Location #3 was within the same Tehran military compound in which Iran Location #2 was located, but just in a different section of the overall compound. It was during this four year period that they were joined by USAMA BIN LADEN's family to include his wife UM HAMZA and his sons SAAD, HAMED, LADEN, UTHMAN, and HAMZA. GHAYTH said that all of USAMA BIN LADEN's sons were released three years prior to his own release.

GHAYTH advised that they would notify the Iranian authorities at the compound whenever they had issues or problems. It would generally be a clerk/administrative type person at the compound who would then pass the complaints on to the higher Iranian authorities. GHAYTH said that the Iranian authorities at the compound wore civilian type clothing, so he assumed they were Intelligence officers. GHAYTH was also under this assumption based on the way they talked and the questions they asked. GHAYTH advised that they may have known Arabic, but did not say they did and only spoke Farsi. There were also Iranian women who came to the compound to help the wives of the Al Qaeda members and these Iranian women spoke Arabic.

Approximately two years into his stay at Iran Location #3, GHAYTH was allowed to communicate with his family. Just prior to the Iranian authorities allowing GHAYTH to communicate with his family, GHAYTH had been on a 21 day hunger strike to protest his inability to communicate with his family. GHAYTH was anxious to let his family know that he was OK and wanted to know how all in his family, including his wife and children in Kuwait, were doing. One of the reasons the Iranian authorities may have allowed GHAYTH to communicate this first time with his family was because, unlike his fellow detainees, GHAYTH did not have his family with him.

GHAYTH lost approximately 22 pounds during his 21 day hunger strike. GHAYTH advised that the Iranian authorities did have a doctor look at GHAYTH during the hunger strike, but stated that the doctor was not all that thorough.

GHAYTH was not allowed to have direct communication with his family on this first occasion. For this first communication with his family, GHAYTH was allowed to record a message to his family on a cassette tape. GHAYTH

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Case 1:98-cr-01023-LAK Document 1535-1 Filed 03/12/14 Page 10 of 21 Document provided by Kronos Advisory's research division http://kronosadvisory.com/Kronos_US_v_Sulaiman_Abu_Ghayth_Statement.pdf FD-302a (Rev, 05-08-10)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

,On 03/01/2013 ,Page 10 of 21

provided the Iranian authorities the cassette tape for onward passage to GHAYTH's family. Shortly thereafter, the Iranian authorities provided GHAYTH with a cassette tape which contained a response from his family. GHAYTH noticed that his wife's voice was not on the cassette tape which contained the response from his family. GHAYTH became very anxious to determine why his wife's voice was not on the cassette and asked the Iranian authorities to allow him to make a telephone call to his family.

Approximately three weeks after getting the reply from his family and asking the Iranian authorities if he could make a telephone call to his family, GHAYTH was allowed to do so. The Iranian authorities provided GHAYTH a cellular telephone to make the telephone call. GHAYTH ended up speaking with his brother during this telephone call and his brother told him that GHAYTH's wife was granted a divorce from GHAYTH because no one had heard from him during the past four years. GHAYTH was not able to speak to his wife during the telephone call.

GHAYTH advised that he was devastated by the news that his wife had been granted a divorce from him and that it remains a painful subject to this day.

Following the above telephone call, GHAYTH was not allowed to make another telephone call until approximately one and a half years later.

Approximately two years into his four year stay at Iran Location #3, GHAYTH and his fellow detainees were allowed to have satellite television and to watch Al Jazeera. Up until that point, they generally were not allowed any type of news or newspapers, but they had been allowed to have books.

ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI arrived to Iran Location #3 approximately two years into GHAYTH's stay at this location. Prior to his arrival, ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI had been living in a separate location within the same Tehran military compound.

ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI informed GHAYTH that prior to his arrival at Iran Location #3, he had been imprisoned with a separate group of individuals. This separate group may have included ANAS AL-LIBI. GHAYTH believed that ANAS AL-LIBI may have been a member of Al Qaeda, but he was not sure.

Like GHAYTH, the other Al Qaeda members in captivity in Iran were generally not allowed any means of communication with the outside world, except on rare occasions.

GHAYTH acknowledged that SAIF AL ADL and ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI were military/operational leaders for Al Qaeda. At some point during their

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

,On 03/01/2013 ,Page 11 of 21

imprisonment together, GHAYTH asked SAIF AL ADL and ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI if they had been involved in the Kenya and Tanzania bombings and both SAIF AL ADL and ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI confirmed to GHAYTH that they had been involved in those bombings. However, GHAYTH was not aware of SAIF AL ADL and/or ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI having been involved in any type of operational planning while they were in Iranian custody.

GHAYTH first met SAIF AL ADL and ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI in Shiraz, Iran, approximately one month before all of them were arrested by the Iranians and brought to Iran Location #1 in 2003. GHAYTH, SAIF AL ADL and ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI were arrested approximately ten months after GHAYTH first arrived in Iran. When GHAYTH first met SAIF AL ADL and ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI in Shiraz, SAIF AL ADL was using the alias IBRAHIM and ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI was using the alias DAOUD SHIRAZI. GHAYTH did not learn their true identities until later.

When asked if there was anyone from Al Qaeda in Iran who was helping to facilitate communications on behalf of the detained Al Qaeda members, GHAYTH said no. GHAYTH advised that there was no way for the Al Qaeda members in Iranian custody to pass messages outside of Iran.

GHAYTH was asked if there was any type of consistent Iranian handler who dealt with GHAYTH and his fellow detainees while they were detained in Iran and GHAYTH said no.

GHAYTH was not aware of anyone from Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda Senior Leadership advocating on behalf of the Al Qaeda members detained in Iran with the Iranian government. GHAYTH pointed to his years without the ability to communicate with the outside world and his harsh treatment at the hands of the Iranian Government as evidence that Al Qaeda did little to nothing to assist him and his fellow detainees. GHAYTH advised that a few of the Al Qaeda detainees escaped Iranian custody, including USAMA BIN LADEN's son SAAD BIN LADEN. GHAYTH later heard that SAAD was killed in Afghanistan. At some point after SAAD escaped, GHAYTH heard that an Iranian diplomat was kidnapped, possibly by Al Qaeda. GHAYTH believes this to be true because approximately a year later some of the Al Qaeda members in Iranian custody started getting released.

KHALED BIN LADEN sent a letter to Iran's Supreme Leader ALI KHAMENEI asking for assistance for the Al Qaeda members detained in Iran. As far as GHAYTH was aware, there was never a response to that letter.

In approximately 2006, GHAYTH married an Egyptian woman, AMAL, who was detained along with him in Iran. Approximately two years later, GHAYTH married USAMA BIN LADEN's daughter, FATIMA BIN LADEN, who was also detained in Iran with GHAYTH and the rest of their group.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Case 1:98-cr-01023-LAK Document 1535-1 Filed 03/12/14 Page 12 of 21 Document provided by Kronos Advisory's research division http://kronosadvisory.com/Kronos_US_v_Sulaiman_Abu_Ghayth_Statement.pdf FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

,On 03/01/2013 ,Page 12 of 21

GHAYTH now has an ex-wife in Kuwait, FATIMA, who was his first wife. GHAYTH has six daughters and one son with his ex-wife.

GHAYTH has two young daughters with his second wife, the Egyptian woman AMAL.

GHAYTH has a young daughter and a newborn son with his third wife, FATIMA BIN LADEN. GHAYTH's newborn son was born approximately two weeks ago and his name is MOHAMMED.

After approximately four years at Iran Location #3, GHAYTH and his family, and the others who were co-located with GHAYTH at Iran Location #3, including SAIF AL ADL, ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI, ABU KHAYR AL-MASRI, ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI and their families, were relocated to new accommodations within the same military compound in Tehran (Iran Location #4). Iran Location #4 was a walled off area with multiple houses, each with a yard, surrounding a central court yard/playground. Each family had its own house at Iran Location #4. GHAYTH believed that the Iranians spent about a year refurbishing Iran Location #4 to get it ready for them.

The Iranian authorities refurbished Iran Location #4 and ultimately relocated GHAYTH and his fellow detainees to Iran Location #4 because the detainees, particularly the women, complained to the Iranian authorities about the terrible conditions at Iran Location #3. The accommodations at Iran Location #3 for each family were very small and unsanitary. As a result, many of the women developed mental conditions and the children were getting sick. Approximately three years into their four year stay at Iran Location #3, GHAYTH and his fellow detainees staged a protest against the terrible conditions of their confinement. In response to the protest, GHAYTH and his fellow detainees, including the women, were beaten and tortured. GHAYTH was beaten on the head by the Iranians, passed out, and was hospitalized as a result. GHAYTH noted that one of his daughters has mental issues because of the harsh treatment by the Iranians and whenever she sees an Iranian she starts to shake uncontrollably.

It is likely that the Iranians started the refurbishment process at Iran Location #4 shortly after the above protests/beatings. Approximately one year later, GHAYTH and his fellow detainees were relocated to Iran Location #4.

GHAYTH and his fellow detainees remained at Iran Location #4 until GHAYTH's recent release from Iranian custody, a time-period of approximately three and a half years. As far as GHAYTH knows, SAIF AL ADL, ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI, ABU KHAYR AL-MASRI and their families are still located at Iran Location #4. Overall, the conditions of GHAYTH's and his

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Case 1:98-cr-01023-LAK Document 1535-1 Filed 03/12/14 Page 13 of 21 Document provided by Kronos Advisory's research division http://kronosadvisory.com/Kronos_US_v_Sulaiman_Abu_Ghayth_Statement.pdf FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

, On 03/01/2013 , Page 13 of 21

fellow detainees' conditions of confinement improved as time went on and each confinement location was a bit better than the preceding location. GHAYTH's time at Iran Location #4 was the most peaceful time during his many years of detention in Iran. During his approximately three and a half years at Iran Location #4, GHAYTH focused on his family/children. GHAYTH noted, however, that amongst some of his fellow detainees and their families there was a lot of chaos. Some of the other detainees argued a lot with the Iranians about opening up their ability to communicate via the internet. Some of the other detainees also argued with the Iranians because these detainees wanted the Iranians to allow the children of the detainees to go to school outside the compound in which they were held.

At some point during his time at Iran Location #4, the Iranians allowed GHAYTH and his fellow detainees to communicate more often with others outside of Iran. Up until the last few months of his detention in Iran, GHAYTH was allowed to make a telephone call to his family about once every six months, which was facilitated by the Iranian authorities. During the last few months of his detention in Iran, GHAYTH was in constant contact with his brother in Kuwait trying to straighten out his citizenship and arrange for his return to Kuwait.

At Iran Location #4, Iranian authorities allowed one detainee per week to use the internet just to browse the web.

At Iran Location #4, the Iranians set up a "private" e-mail account for GHAYTH to use and then a "public" e-mail account which was shared by all of the other detainees co-located with GHAYTH. GHAYTH and his fellow detainees were not allowed to actually access these e-mail accounts and physically write and send/receive e-mails. If they wanted to send an e-mail, they had to write out the e-mail, hand it over to the Iranian authorities and the Iranian authorities, after reviewing the e-mail, would actually draft and send the e-mail. GHAYTH did send some e-mails via this method of communication. Those e-mails GHAYTH sent where strictly to his family members outside of Iran, i.e. his brother and one of his daughters. GHAYTH received some responses to his e-mails, which were provided to him by the Iranian authorities in hard copy.

GHAYTH did not know what the actual e-mail address was for his private e-mail account or the public account used by all of his other fellow detainees.

During the time-period at Iran Location #4, ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI escaped from the Iranian compound where they were detained and fled to the Mauritanian Embassy. ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI remained at the Mauritanian Embassy for approximately 60 days and was shortly thereafter deported by the Iranians back to Mauritania. GHAYTH could not say for sure if this

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Case 1:98-cr-01023-LAK Document 1535-1 Filed 03/12/14 Page 14 of 21 Document provided by Kronos Advisory's research division http://kronosadvisory.com/Kronos_US_v_Sulaiman_Abu_Ghayth_Statement.pdf FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

, On 03/01/2013 .Page 14 of 21

story about ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI's escape from Iranian custody was accurate because it was something he was told.

It was during GHAYTH's time at Iran Location #3 that GHAYTH wrote "Twenty Guidelines on the Path of Jihad". It took GHAYTH approximately 20 months to complete this book. GHAYTH was inspired to write this book because of the actions of some of the jihad movements/groups post-September 11, 2001, and the resulting poor image of jihad that these groups were portraying. These groups included Zarqawi's Group in Iraq, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and others. For example, GHAYTH saw the bombing of markets and other public places in Iraq by Zarqawi's Group as unjust and not in line with the true principles of jihad. Along the same lines, GHAYTH believed that these types of actions were also far out of line with the ideology of USAMA BIN LADEN. GHAYTH believed that many of today's Muslim youth were running out to participate in jihad without any awareness of the religious, political, or historical context for jihad. They were not following the true idea/path of jihad. GHAYTH is against Muslims fighting other Muslims and the killing of innocent Muslims and non-Muslims. GHAYTH believed that jihad should be in self defense and that one does not participate in jihad simply for the sake of killing. To properly participate in jihad, one should be aware of the entire political, religious and historical situation and not enter into jihad in an ignorant fashion.

ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI wrote the forward for "Twenty Guidelines on the Path of Jihad". GHAYTH and ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI were in agreement with regard to GHAYTH's opinions/conclusions expressed in this book.

Upon completion of "Twenty Guidelines on the Path of Jihad", GHAYTH considered two methods by which to get his manuscript out of Iran and ultimately published. First, GHAYTH knew that USAMA BIN LADEN's daughter, EMAN, who was co-located with GHAYTH, was going to flee the compound in which they were held in an attempt to escape. GHAYTH considered entrusting EMAN with his manuscript in the hope that she would be successful in her escape and could ultimately get the manuscript published. Second, SAIF AL ADL's father-in-law, ABU WALID, visited with them about once every three months. ABU WALID had a strong relationship with USAMA BIN LADEN but was not an official member of Al Qaeda. GHAYTH had previously met ABU WALID in 2001 during a five to ten minute gathering with USAMA BIN LADEN at a house in Afghanistan. ABU WALID was also detained in Iran, however, ABU WALID was only under house arrest and had much more freedom of movement than GHAYTH, SAIF AL ADL and their fellow co-located detainees. GHAYTH considered giving ABU WALID his manuscript in an effort to get it out of the compound and ultimately published.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

,On 03/01/2013 ,Page 15 of 21

Ultimately, GHAYTH provided the manuscript to USAMA BIN LADEN's daughter, EMAN, and to ABU WALID. EMAN successfully escaped from Iran and GHAYTH believed it was EMAN who got his manuscript published.

GHAYTH was questioned as to why Iranian authorities chose the present time to release GHAYTH. GHAYTH advised that approximately one and a half years ago, the Iranian authorities told GHAYTH, SAIF AL ADL, ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI, ABU KHAYR AL-MASRI and their fellow detainees that the Iranians would release any of them who chose to leave, but that they had to return from Iran to their home countries. They were not going to be allowed to relocate from Iran to any other third country, i.e. Pakistan. SAIF AL ADL, ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI, and ABU KHAYR AL-MASRI were concerned about the treatment they would receive in their home country of Egypt if they returned, so they did not accept this offer from the Iranians and instead chose to remain in Iranian custody.

When the Iranian authorities made the above offer of release, GHAYTH began to coordinate with his brother in Kuwait to try and regain his Kuwaiti citizenship so that he could return to Kuwait. In the last several months of his confinement in Iran, this coordination with his brother increased significantly. Finally, after all of this coordination with his brother in Kuwait, GHAYTH believed that he would be successful in returning to Kuwait, so he asked the Iranians to release him. Once GHAYTH indicated that he wanted to depart Iran and that he'd be able to return to Kuwait, the Iranians started pushing for GHAYTH to depart Iran.

Toward the end of his time in Iran, when he was allowed to communicate frequently with his family in order to coordinate his return to Kuwait, GHAYTH was allowed to use a mobile telephone which belonged to the administration of the compound. Approximately one month before his release, GHAYTH was allowed to use Skype, without video, to communicate with his family, including his brother.

When asked what his plan was upon his release, GHAYTH advised that his plan was to simply return to Kuwait to be with his family. He further stated that he was sick and tired given all that had happened to him.

When asked about plans that his fellow detainees SAIF AL ADL, ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI and ABU KHAYR AL-MASRI may have if/when they are ever released and whether or not they would rejoin Al Qaeda or the jihad, GHAYTH described them as beaten men. They are beaten men due to the length and severity of their detention in Iran. GHAYTH believed that these men were primarily concerned with the day-to-day activities/welfare of their families in Iran and that they have no larger intentions that he was aware of to continue the jihad if/when they are released.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

.On 03/01/2013 Page 16 of 21

GHAYTH noted that during his and his fellow detainees' detention in Iran, the Iranian authorities told them that their imprisonment in Iran was in coordination with the U.S.

GHAYTH emphasized that what he was telling interviewers was true and accurately reflected what he was thinking. He advised that he was not saying things to interviewers just to receive some type of special benefit. Many people are skeptical that the book ("Twenty Guidelines on the Path of Jihad") was actually written by GHAYTH, but GHAYTH stressed that he did in fact write that book and that the ideas in the book were his ideas.

GHAYTH advised interviewers that whether he had a lawyer or not, interviewers would be welcome to ask him any questions they wanted to. GHAYTH advised that he was being honest and that if there were any misunderstanding about what he told interviewers, they could discuss with him and he would correct/provide clarification to the matter.

Interviewers explained to GHAYTH his right to be presented to a U.S. Magistrate Judge upon arrival to the U.S. and all that this process would entail, including the assignment at that time of an attorney to represent him. Interviewers also advised GHAYTH that he also had the right to waive this speedy initial presentment, and that if he was amenable to doing so, interviewers would bring him to a safe hotel-like location once the plane landed and GHAYTH/interviewers could then continue their discussion likely for several more days. Interviewers advised that they would prefer the latter option because it allowed interviewers to obtain all of the relevant information GHAYTH possessed in a more timely manner than the first option. That said, interviewers stressed to GHAYTH that the choice was completely his and that regardless of which option he chose, GHAYTH would continue to be treated fairly and with respect. GHAYTH advised that he wanted to think about these two options before deciding and interviewers advised that he was certainly welcome to do so. In the context of this discussion about initial presentment, GHAYTH again stated that he will be 100% cooperative with interviewers whether or not he has a lawyer.

Using SA Butsch's Blackberry telephone, interviewers showed GHAYTH a photograph known to the FBI to be a photograph of FAIZ AL-KANDARI.

GHAYTH identified the individual in the photograph as FAIZ AL-KANDARI.

Using SA Butsch's Blackberry telephone, interviewers showed GHAYTH a photograph known to the FBI to be a photograph of ANAS AL-KANDARI.

GHAYTH identified the individual in the photograph as ANAS AL-KANDARI.

GHAYTH advised that he, FAIZ AL-KANDARI and ANAS AL-KANDARI grew up in

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Case 1:98-cr-01023-LAK Document 1535-1 Filed 03/12/14 Page 17 of 21 Document provided by Kronos Advisory's research division http://kronosadvisory.com/Kronos_US_v_Sulaiman_Abu_Ghayth_Statement.pdf FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

____,On 03/01/2013 ,Page 17 of 21

the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait together. GHAYTH taught ANAS AL-KANDARI when ANAS AL-KANDARI was in middle school. FAIZ, who was older than ANAS, was someone GHAYTH knew from their neighborhood in Kuwait. FAIZ Al-KANDARI and ANAS AL-KANDARI were related by family name but not by blood. GHAYTH heard that FAIZ was currently being held at Guantanamo Bay. Through listening to a news report on the radio from BBC, GHAYTH learned that ANAS AL-KANDARI was shot and killed by an American soldier on Faylaka Island . When GHAYTH was ultimately granted periodic access to the internet in Iran, he read about this incident with ANAS AL-KANDARI on Faylaka Island. GHAYTH thought that this incident with ANAS AL-KANDARI on Faylaka Island occurred in approximately 2002 or 2003 prior to the invasion of Iraq.

Both ANAS AL-KANDARI and FAIZ AL-KANDARI went to Afghanistan. ANAS AL-KANDARI was already in Afghanistan when GHAYTH arrived in June 2001. ANAS AL-KANDARI visited GHAYTH shortly after GHAYTH arrived to Kandahar, Afghanistan in June 2001. GHAYTH rented a house in Kandahar in this time-period and ANAS AL-KANDARI visited GHAYTH for lunch on a few occasions. GHAYTH advised that it was possible that ANAS AL-KANDARI attended a training camp while he was in Afghanistan and assumed that ANAS AL-KANDARI was residing at the Kandahar guest house across the street from the House of Pomegranates, while he was in Kandahar. This guest house was used by those coming and going from training at the training camps.

GHAYTH did not believe that FAIZ AL-KANDARI attended a training camp in Afghanistan because FAIZ AL-KANDARI was like him (GHAYTH), a spiritual preacher. FAIZ AL-KANDARI spent most of his time while in Kandahar at the House of Pomegranates.

GHAYTH advised that it was easy to travel from country to country as long as you have a passport, particularly a Kuwaiti passport. It was common knowledge among the Arabs that they should go to Kandahar if they wanted to attend training at the training camps or join the jihad movement in Afghanistan. The guest house across the street from the House of Pomegranates was flocked with a lot of people. GHAYTH noted that they even found some spies at this guest house at some point.

There were not a lot of people from Kuwait who traveled to Afghanistan to join the jihad movement, however, there was a huge number of people from Saudi Arabia who did so.

The guest house frequently had guest speakers.

Interviewers advised GHAYTH that normally, in order to stay at the guest house across the street from the House of Pomegranates, to attend a training camp in Afghanistan, or attend classes at the House of Pomegranates, one could not simply show up without references or someone

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

,On 03/01/2013 ,Page 18 of 21

known/trusted by USAMA BIN LADEN'S group vouching for the person. GHAYTH was asked if he was aware of who may have vouched for ANAS AL-KANDARI or FAIZ AL-KANDARI in order for them to frequent these locations in Kandahar. GHAYTH advised that he did not know if anyone had vouched for them.

Shortly after GHAYTH first arrived to Afghanistan in June 2001, ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI had GHAYTH over for lunch. Their meeting was brief, and GHAYTH didn't get to really know ABU HAFS AL -MAURITANI well until they were in Iranian custody together.

GHAYTH was not aware of any official relationship between Al Qaeda and Iranian Intelligence. In GHAYTH's opinion, Iran doesn't want any Sunni Muslim group to gain power.

GHAYTH was not given any type of tasking by Iranian Intelligence and he advised that he would never cooperate with Iran. GHAYTH blamed Iran for many of the hardships in his life, including some of his health issues and his divorce from his first wife. No one from Iranian Intelligence asked GHAYTH to contact them at any future point. GHAYTH was not provided any means, i.e. telephone number, by which he could re-contact Iranian Intelligence. GHAYTH believed that Iran informed the U.S. of his (GHAYTH's) release from Iran into Turkey.

Prior to releasing him, the Iranian authorities advised GHAYTH that if things did not work out with his return to Kuwait, he could return to Iran. However, as explained below, the Iranian authorities turned GHAYTH over to a series of smugglers who smuggled GHAYTH and his wife FATIMA into Turkey. If he had wanted to return, GHAYTH would have had to do so with the assistance of the smugglers and GHAYTH did not have contact information for these smugglers.

At approximately 10:20 AM (EST) on March 1, 2013, the FBI Interpreter present during the interview translated the enclosed Waiver of Initial Presentment form to GHAYTH. Following the complete translation of the document, GHAYTH advised interviewers that he did not want to waive his right to a speedy initial presentment. GHAYTH explained to interviewers that for the past approximately 11 years in Iran, he had not had the option of seeing a judge or a lawyer. GHAYTH advised that he would like to speak to a lawyer at presentment so he could better understand the legal process. Interviewers reiterated to GHAYTH that the choice was completely up to him, that he would be treated fairly and with respect by interviewers regardless of his choice to waive or not waive his initial presentment, and acknowledged GHAYTH's choice to not waive his initial presentment. GHAYTH then advised that he would like to continue to cooperate with interviewers.

In June 2001, shortly after GHAYTH arrived in Afghanistan, and at the

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

_____, On 03/01/2013 , Page 19 of 21

request of USAMA BIN LADEN, GHAYTH gave two speeches at training camps. GHAYTH was aware, as stated above, that the trainees at these training camps at which he was speaking were learning weapons, explosives, and guerrilla tactics skills. The first speech was approximately five minutes and took place at a training camp called Dar Mawak (phonetic). Following this speech, GHAYTH gave another speech to trainees at the training camp located at USAMA BIN LADEN'S compound outside of Kandahar. This compound was called Al Matar. A huge number of new training camp trainees, no less than 150 at each speech, attended GHAYTH's speeches at the training camps.

The speeches GHAYTH provided to the trainees at the training camps, both of which were pre-September 11, 2001, were religious in nature. GHAYTH's goal in giving the speeches at the training camps was, in a religious context, to help the trainees understand the purpose of the training they were receiving, the importance of defense, and generally make them aware of why they were at the training camp.

GHAYTH advised that in Islam, it is an obligation to prepare yourself for defense and to train. This is no different than any nation having its young people train to defend the nation. However, GHAYTH noted that not all training camps teach the correct ideology. GHAYTH used some of the training camps in Syria as an example of camps that are not teaching the correct ideology. Some of the training camps in Syria are teaching the correct ideology, preparation, and practice, but some are not.

In addition to the above speeches at the two training camps, GHAYTH gave two to three sermons at USAMA BIN LADEN's compound. USAMA BIN LADEN's compound contained a number of houses where USAMA BIN LADEN and other senior leaders lived, and within the compound there was a mosque. Approximately 10-15 people attended GHAYTH's sermons at USAMA BIN LADEN's compound. The attendees included family members living at the compound.

GHAYTH advised that he never gave any speeches at any of the guest houses in Afghanistan and he never asked any trainees to pledge bayat to USAMA BIN LADEN in any of his speeches.

GHAYTH advised that he never asked any trainees to pledge bayat to MULLAH OMAR and noted that Arab fighters would generally not pledge bayat to someone like MULLAH OMAR anyway because they had their own groups.

GHAYTH was shown a photograph labeled #4 (known to the FBI as MUHSIN AL-FADHLI). GHAYTH did not recognize the individual in photograph #4. GHAYTH advised that he had been shown the same photograph in Turkey by Turkish authorities, the Turkish authorities told GHAYTH that the

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

, On 03/01/2013 . Page 20 of 21

individual in photograph #4 knew GHAYTH and asked GHAYTH if this individual had been in Iran. GHAYTH told the Turkish authorities that he did not know this individual.

GHAYTH was shown a photograph labeled #5 (known to the FBI as YASIN AL-SURI). GHAYTH did not recognize the individual in photograph #5.

Based upon his time in Iran, GHAYTH knew that the compound in which he was imprisoned was in Tehran. He believed it was a military facility because he saw people in military uniforms walking around. He was often not able to see much of the compound, even in Iran Location #4, because he and his fellow detainees generally lived in an area of the compound that was surrounded by a high wall. GHAYTH did recall seeing people on a tower or high building near his living quarters doing some type of rappelling training. These individuals doing the rappelling were wearing uniforms. GHAYTH also noticed that the compound contained residential buildings which he believed were housing for military members working in the area. When GHAYTH was taken out of his confinement area in a vehicle by the Iranian Authorities, the windows of the vehicle were blacked out so he was unable to view the surrounding area.

During their time at Iran Location #4, GHAYTH and his fellow detainees were able to move about Iran Location #4 freely. GHAYTH generally saw SAIF AL ADL, ABU MOHAMMED AL-MASRI and ABU KHAYR AL-MASRI five times a day during prayer times. Most of their meetings/interaction together took place at the mosque, because they each had their own families to attend to. However, they occasionally did visit one another outside of the mosque/prayer times.

Upon his release from Iranian custody, GHAYTH was taken via automobile by individuals whom he believed to be from Iranian Intelligence, including the head of the military compound in which he had been imprisoned, from the compound in Tehran to a border town called Orumiyeh. GHAYTH was also accompanied by his wife, FATIMA, and his young daughter. They were handed over to a smuggler once in Orumiyeh. They stayed in Orumiyeh for four days due to bad weather. From Orumiyeh, they traveled via automobile to another Iranian town which was ten minutes from the Turkish border. They remained in this second Iranian city for three days due to bad weather. On the third day, GHAYTH and his family were taken by another smuggler to the Iranian/Turkish border along with about 50 other people. Once they reached the Iranian border, they had to walk for about 35 minutes to reach the Turkish border. There were cars waiting for them on the Turkish side of the border when they arrived. One of the smugglers gave GHAYTH an Iranian passport which contained an Iranian name, something like MAHRAN ARIF PAYA (phonetic).

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

415A-NY-307616

Continuation of FD-302 of SULAYMAN ABU GHAYTH

, On 03/01/2013 , Page 21 of 21

GHAYTH believed that the smugglers who took him and his family from Iran to Turkey worked for Iranian authorities. The smuggler who met him in Turkey was named NAJI. GHAYTH did not have any contact information for NAJI. GHAYTH learned that this smuggler's name was NAJI from the Turkish authorities. NAJI was Turkish, in his mid-50's, was of medium height, was slim and had no facial hair.

GHAYTH purchased a mobile telephone in one of the Iranian border towns and was in constant contact with his brother and brother-in-law, ABDULLAH BIN LADEN, during his travel from Iran to Turkey. When asked if he spoke with anyone else while traveling from Iran to Turkey, he advised that he only spoke with family.

Shortly after their arrival into Turkey, GHAYTH took his wife, FATIMA, to the Saudi Arabian Embassy. After FATIMA was at the Saudi Arabian Embassy, GHAYTH told the smuggler NAJI that he (NAJI) could depart because FATIMA obtained documents to return to Saudi Arabia. Approximately 10 hours after arriving in Turkey, while in Ankara and on his way to dinner with FATIMA and her brother, ABDULLAH, GHAYTH was arrested by Turkish authorities.

GHAYTH had no information regarding a person named Robert Levinson or a former FBI Agent who may have been kidnapped in Iran in approximately 2007. GHAYTH did hear about some American hikers who were captured in Iran (NFI).

The interview on the FBI Gulfstream V aircraft commenced at approximately 10:00PM (EST) on February 28, 2013, and was discontinued at approximately 12:00PM (EST) on March 01, 2013. Throughout the flight to New York and the above interview, as stated above, interviewers made it clear to GHAYTH that he could ask to take a break for food, water, to rest, pray or use the bathroom at any time and that the request would be granted. GHAYTH was provided several breaks throughout the flight/interview in order to rest, pray, use the bathroom, stretch his legs, and to allow the FBI medic to conduct routine medical evaluations to ensure GHAYTH was in good health. After each break, at the very beginning of each new interview session, interviewers asked GHAYTH if he was willing to carry on with the interview and each time GHAYTH confirmed that he was willing to carry on.